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RUNNING IN PLACE: THE PARADOX 
OF EXPANDING RIGHTS AND 
RESTRICTED REMEDIES† 
David Rudovsky* 
In the spring 2004 David C. Baum Memorial Lecture, David 
Rudovsky argued that although constitutional and statutory rights 
have generally been expanding since the historic Brown v. Board of 
Education, federal remedies have not kept pace.  Contrary to views 
expressed by Chief Justice John Marshall, there now exists a paradox 
of legal rights without remedy.  Although major remedial decisions of 
the Warren Court, such as Mapp v. Ohio and Monroe v. Pape, have 
not been expressly overruled, the Supreme Court has in later deci-
sions significantly limited their impact.  The Court has increasingly 
turned to prospective rulings, but while these provide some guidelines 
to future actors, they deprive the harmed individual recompense for 
the violations of her rights.  Extensions of the doctrine of qualified 
immunity and the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity, as 
well as congressional legislation limiting litigation by prisoners and 
access to habeas corpus, have created a system where only egregious 
violations of rights may be subject to remedial judicial action. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,1 which 
marked the start of the modern civil rights era, provides an appropriate 
historical point to evaluate the current status of civil rights law and 
remedies.  In this period, the combination of social and advocacy move-
ments (led by the Black Civil Rights Movement), the development of 
constitutional doctrine by the Supreme Court, and the congressional en-
 
 †  This article was originally presented on March 11, 2004, as the second 2003–04 lecture of the 
David C. Baum Memorial Lectures on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the University of Illinois Col-
lege of Law. 
 *  Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania School of Law; Founding Partner, Kairys, Ru-
dovsky, Epstein & Messing, LLP, Philadelphia.  I thank Brandon Garrett, Seth Kreimer, David 
Richman, Leonard Sosnov, and Catherine Struve for comments and suggestions.  Tom Stenson pro-
vided excellent research assistance. 
 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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actment of civil rights laws broadly expanded rights and liberties.2  The 
judicial and legislative developments have touched virtually all groups in 
our society and have impacted a broad range of political and social is-
sues.  Racial and ethnic minorities, women, the disabled, juveniles, the 
elderly, gays and lesbians, prisoners, and the criminally accused have ex-
perienced significant changes in their legal status.  In addition, the con-
tent of basic constitutional guarantees—equal protection, due process of 
law, religious and speech freedoms, privacy and autonomy—has been 
profoundly redefined by court decisions and legislative action.3 
Each area of change has generated widespread scholarly and public 
debate and commentary on the scope and limitations of the substantive 
rights at stake.  Quite obviously, the degree to which civil rights and civil 
liberties are established as a matter of constitutional law is largely a func-
tion of this substantive constitutional adjudicative process.4  Supreme 
Court decisions that define the scope of rights are the necessary starting 
point for assessing the overall status of rights and liberties,5 but as we 
know from history and experience, rights may exist on paper as a matter 
of court decision or legislation, but their viability, indeed their very es-
sence, depends in large part on the effectiveness of remedial and en-
forcement measures. 
In this article, I will address the other side of the constitutional 
rights coin—the remedial framework for vindicating and enforcing civil 
rights.  Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court (and in recent 
years, the Congress) has restricted civil rights remedies through a series 
of complex and controversial measures, including expanded immunities 
from suit, narrower standards for standing and for private enforcement 
of civil rights legislation, exceptions to the exclusionary rule, limitations 
on remedies in criminal cases and federal habeas corpus, and direct fed-
eral court door-closing legislation.  As a result, the normal remedies for 
constitutional and statutory violations—compensation, equitable relief, 
and criminal procedural sanctions—are denied in many cases.  More dis-
 
 2. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63 
(1988); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based 
Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002). 
 3. See generally THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(5th ed. 2004); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988). 
 4. Civil rights and civil liberties are normally viewed as common and mutually enforcing con-
cepts.  For a discussion of the sometimes antagonistic relationship of rights and liberties, see Richard 
Delgado, About Your Masthead: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Compatibility of Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 5–15 (2004). 
 5. In the past 25 years, state constitutional law has played an increasingly significant role in the 
overall structure of rights and liberties.  See, e.g., JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1995); THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (Gormley et al. 
eds., 2004); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 179–87 (3d 
ed. 1999); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions 
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548–52 (1986).  In many respects, however, 
the extension of state constitutional rights has been limited by the same forces I discuss with respect to 
federally protected rights. 
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turbing, by excusing “reasonable” constitutional violations and remedy-
ing only the most egregious official misconduct, the Court has in effect 
ruled that officials who violate constitutional rights may do so in some 
instances without fear of sanctions.  Officials may well conform their 
conduct to the sub-constitutional norms for remedies as opposed to sub-
stantive constitutional principles and thereby erode both the structure of 
rights and governmental accountability. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF RIGHTS TO REMEDIES 
The integral relationship of rights to remedies was recognized early 
in our constitutional history when Chief Justice John Marshall asserted in 
Marbury v. Madison:6 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists of the right 
of every individual to claim protection of the laws, wherever he re-
ceives an injury, one of the first duties of government is to afford 
that protection. . . . 
[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a le-
gal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, 
whenever that right is invaded . . . . [E]very right, when withheld, 
must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress. 
The Government of the United States has been emphatically 
termed a government of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly 
cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy 
for the violation of a vested legal right.7 
In a more modern exposition, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court held that 
there is an implied constitutional cause of action for damages for a fourth 
amendment violation against federal officials, since “where legal rights 
have been invaded . . . federal courts may use any available remedy to 
make good the wrong done.”8 
Even if we allow for some poetic (or judicial) license, and recognize 
that a “right-remedy gap” may be inevitable,9 the John Marshall com-
mandment provides a useful standard against which to gauge the nation’s 
 
 6. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 7. Id. at 163; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 
(1897) (stating that “legal duty” is a function of remedy).  State Constitutions of the original thirteen 
states recognized the right to a remedy.  See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sov-
ereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1902–14 (1983). 
 8. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) 
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”). 
 9. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 113 
(1999) (“To say that there are gaps between right and remedy is really only to acknowledge that the 
law of remedies, as a body of doctrine not generalizable across all enforcement mechanisms, exists.”) 
[hereinafter Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap]; see also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 
YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (calling law of remedies a “jurisprudence of deficiency, of what is lost be-
tween declaring a right and implementing a remedy”). 
RUDOVSKY.DOC 10/13/2005  2:30:49 PM 
1202 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2005 
commitment to the protection of rights and liberties.10  Redress for con-
stitutionally based deprivations is of substantial importance if we expect 
that government will act within the bounds of the Constitution.  Whether 
the concepts of rights and remedies are properly analyzed as separate le-
gal concepts or are more properly understood as being “inextricably in-
tertwined” and part of a “symbiotic relationship,”11 a debate that has di-
vided constitutional scholars along theoretical lines, the discourse helps 
to illuminate the critical significance of the remedial framework.  Profes-
sor Levinson has characterized the opposing theories as “rights essential-
ism” and “remedial equilibration.”12  Rights essentialism, a theory he as-
sociates with the views of Professors Sager, Dworkin, and Fiss,13 assumes 
a process of constitutional adjudication that begins with judicial identifi-
cation of a pure constitutional value, without regard to remedies or en-
forcement.  This “pure value” is then subject to limitations by a remedial 
apparatus that translates the right into a weaker operational rule when 
applied to the facts of the real world.14  Under this view, rights and reme-
dies are separate concepts and are largely “incommensurable entities.”15 
 
 10. For further commentary on the relationship of rights to remedies, see generally RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN 
REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983) [hereinafter SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT]; Akhil R. 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge 
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, 
New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1991); Owen M. 
Fiss, Foreword, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Gewirtz, supra note 9; John C. 
Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47 (1998) [herein-
after Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment]; Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 9; Sam Kamin, 
Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1 (2002); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming 
the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183 (2003); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism 
and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitu-
tional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 
88 COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword, Constitutional Common Law, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public 
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal 
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). 
 11. Levinson, supra note 10, at 858, 914; Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transat-
lantique, 43 F.2d 941, 943 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) (“[A] right without any remedy is a meaningless 
scholasticism . . . .”); see Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limita-
tions on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1293 (2000) (“Substan-
tive rights . . . are worth no more than the procedural mechanisms available for their realization and 
protection.”); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise 
of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1413 (1983) (expressing doubt that “the central 
problems for constitutional law . . . are issues of the definition of rights rather than the creation of a 
machinery of jurisdiction and remedies that can transform rights proclaimed on paper into practical 
protections”). 
 12. Levinson, supra note 10, at 858.  Several scholars have approached the issue of rights and 
remedies from a wider institutional framework and have emphasized the need for building coalitions 
and institutions to make civil rights remedies more effective.  See, e.g., James Liebman & Brandon 
Garrett, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (2004). 
 13. Id. at 861–72. 
 14. Id. at 858. 
 15. Id. at 914. 
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By contrast, the theory of “remedial equilibration” views rights and 
remedies as “inextricably intertwined.”16  “Rights are dependent on 
remedies not just for their application to the real world, but for their 
scope, shape, and very existence.”17  For Levinson, the notion of a “pure 
right” is a fiction,18 as remedies ultimately control the value of any consti-
tutional right.19  Under this view, when the Court articulates the scope of 
a constitutional right, it does so against the backdrop of the remedial 
field, and the constitutional definition is directly affected by the range of 
possible remedies.20 
This debate—and the perceived dichotomy—is useful in focusing on 
the processes that the Court has employed in defining rights, but  neither 
polar view successfully captures the universe of rights-remedies relation-
ships.  For example, certain remedial limitations operate independent of 
the substantive rights.  Thus, Eleventh Amendment and absolute prose-
cutorial and judicial immunity do not redefine or abrogate the right as-
serted; rather, they operate to immunize from damage claims the uncon-
stitutional or otherwise unlawful conduct of specific classes of officials.21  
It may well be that these immunities were recognized by the Supreme 
Court to limit the reach of certain substantive rights, but in operation 
they function in an independent manner. 
Other remedial doctrines, such as the defense of qualified immu-
nity, which precludes damages relief against governmental officers who 
violate rights that were not “clearly established” at the time,22 can oper-
ate both separately and apart from the constitutional right involved and 
as “rights defining” doctrine.  The Supreme Court has imposed a formal 
 
 16. Id. at 858. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 924. 
 19. Id. at 914. 
 20. The debate over the relationship of rights and remedies in the fields of constitutional law and 
civil rights reflects a similar dialogue regarding the role and scope of remedies in private law.  There, 
too, the question of how a legal right should be protected and remedied has divided the commentators.  
Scholars and the courts have recognized the availability of property rules (requiring consent of owner 
before transfer of entitlements is allowed) and liability rules (that would compensate in damages for 
entitlements taken).  See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2002); Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Eugene Kontorovich, 
Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case for Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755 (2004).  
Under the prevailing property and liability rules, injunctive relief would be the presumptive remedy 
for violations or threatened violations of rights, while damages would be a default remedy when resto-
ration of the entitlement is not feasible.  As I discuss below, this paradigm does not fit well in the civil 
rights field where much of what is litigated presents issues of damages only.  See Seth F. Kreimer, Ex-
ploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 427, 467 nn.105–07 (1997).  And, as will be shown, the remedial framework in civil rights litiga-
tion not infrequently denies both forms of relief. 
 21. See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (holding that prosecutors enjoyed absolute 
immunity from suit for constitutional violation committed in bringing charges and in pursuing a crimi-
nal case); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 
(1872), which required a “clear absence of all jurisdiction to permit suit against judge”). 
 22. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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separation in rights and remedies by requiring a court first to determine 
if a constitutional violation has occurred and, if so, then to decide 
whether the right was clearly established.23  However, this methodology 
does not fully uncouple right and remedy.  As I will discuss, in protecting 
governmental defendants in cases in which they acted reasonably, albeit 
in violation of the Constitution, the doctrine carries with it a strong po-
tential for the erosion of substantive rights by individual and institutional 
adoption of sub-constitutional standards. 
Brown v. Board of Education provides a revealing case history of 
the complex interplay of constitutional doctrine and remedies.  The deci-
sion in Brown was almost immediately transformed into a battle over 
remedies.  The famous—or infamous—“with all deliberate speed” in-
junction by the Supreme Court,24 was an enforcement compromise and, 
in the face of “massive resistance”25 by the southern political and social 
systems, a decade passed before the Court finally ordered previously seg-
regated school systems to eliminate “all vestiges of prior segregation.”26 
Desegregation efforts were successful for some period of time, but a 
combination of factors, including white flight from southern school dis-
tricts and the de facto segregated status of northern school districts, 
forced the Court to reconsider both the substantive scope of its equal 
protection doctrine and the remedial powers of federal courts in enforc-
ing the desegregation mandate.  As the Brown era unfolded, the Court 
was faced with competing visions of equality:  was the right to racial 
equality limited to the prohibition of de jure segregation or was it a right 
to an integrated education based on a broader claim of a right to be free 
from racial subordination?27  Ultimately, the Court answered these ques-
tions by refusing to broaden the substantive scope of equal protection 
principles beyond a prohibition against de jure or intentional discrimina-
tion and by limiting the remedies available in federal courts.  By very 
close margins, the Court ruled that de facto segregation could not be 
 
 23. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2004) (holding that the facial invalidity of a war-
rant which failed to specify which items were to be seized precluded a claim of qualified immunity, 
even though a magistrate had issued the warrant); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745–46 (2002) (ruling 
that the “obvious cruelty” of tying a prisoner to a hitching post for hours provided sufficient notice of 
the wrongfulness of the practice, precluding the claim that a lack of case law relating to similar fact 
patterns allowed a claim of qualified immunity). 
 24. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II]. 
 25. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964). 
 26. Id. at 234 (“The time for mere ‘deliberate speed’ has run out . . . .”); see also Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“The objective today remains to eliminate from 
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.”); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 
437–38 (1968) (holding that Brown II “charged [schools] with the affirmative duty to take whatever 
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be elimi-
nated root and branch”). 
 27. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST 
HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2004); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisub-
ordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1470 (2004); Kathleen Sullivan, What Happened to Brown?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 23, 2004 at 47. 
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remedied,28 that interdistrict transfers of students were not permissible 
absent a showing of past discriminatory practices,29 that there was no 
duty for a state to provide a funding system that would ensure equality in 
funding of local education,30 and that lower courts could not continue to 
enforce desegregation programs that were not believed to be narrowly 
tailored to meet the original segregation patterns.31  It is difficult to sepa-
rate the substantive and remedial threads of these decisions, but the end 
result is an equal protection doctrine that prohibits only de jure or inten-
tional segregation.32 
The centrality of the remedial issues was apparent in the Court’s 
first opinions regarding the government’s war on terrorism.33  Not sur-
prisingly, much of the Court’s discussion of these significant constitu-
tional challenges was centered on threshold remedial and jurisdictional 
issues of access to the courts, separation of powers, and judicial authority 
in times of war.34  The Court refused to close the courthouse doors to 
persons held as unlawful combatants and, as a result, the substantive con-
tent of the due process rights will be developed in light of the general 
principles regarding the right to a “meaningful opportunity” to contest 
the grounds for detention that were articulated by the Court.35  Thus, the 
issue of terrorism and civil liberties, like many others, will find its resolu-
tion at the intersection of substantive constitutional rights, access to the 
courts, and remedies. 
 
 28. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–22 (1995). 
 29. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) (holding that Brown stood only for the right of 
a child to attend a desegregated school within that school district); id. at 806–07 (Marshall, J. dissent-
ing, joined by Douglas, Brennan, & White JJ.) (“The nature of a violation determines the scope of the 
remedy simply because the function of any remedy is to cure the violation to which it is ad-
dressed . . . . [A] remedy which effectively cures the violation is what is required. No more is necessary, 
but we can tolerate no less.” (citations omitted)). 
 30. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (holding that, in terms of 
funding, the Equal Protection Clause does not require “absolute equality”). 
 31. See, e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 137.  For discussions of the Court’s role, see ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, THE SEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE 
COURTS’ ROLE, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ATTORNEYS FEES HANDBOOK (2003); GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Michael J. 
Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 75–85 (1994). 
 32. Indeed, the decision in Rodriguez, finding no equal protection violation in unequal funding 
of local school districts, while framed in substantive equal protection jurisprudence, has been viewed 
as an example of an “under-enforced” constitutional doctrine, heavily influenced by matters of feder-
alism, judicial competence, and separation of powers.  Sager, supra note 10. 
 33. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698–99 (2004) (holding that United States courts have juris-
diction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad and 
held at Guantanamo Bay); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004) (holding that American 
citizen held as unlawful combatant has a due process right to challenge the factual basis for his deten-
tion); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2721–22 (2004) (holding that habeas challenge must be 
made in state of actual detention). 
 34. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698–99; Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2721–22. 
 35. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649 (holding that Due Process requires that citizen held as an en-
emy combatant have a meaningful opportunity to contest grounds for detention); Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 
2698–99 (holding that courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges by enemy combatants at 
Guantanamo Bay). 
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III. LIMITATIONS ON RIGHTS BY REMEDIAL RESTRICTIONS 
The growth of constitutional and statutory civil rights in the modern 
civil rights era (1954–2004) has been an ebb and flow process.  While ex-
pansion of rights characterizes this half-century,36 the trend has been 
qualified by Court decisions limiting new doctrine.37  However, a full sub-
stantive constitutional counter-revolution has not materialized, even in 
areas in which the current Court would be unlikely to recognize the 
rights established by earlier decisions.  Thus, cases like Miranda v. Ari-
zona and Mapp v. Ohio have been doctrinally redefined, and limited in 
application, but have not been expressly overruled.38  In certain areas, for 
example with respect to First Amendment speech and associational 
rights, the Court, reflecting a broad ideological consensus on free speech 
issues, has regularly broadened these rights.39 At the same time, the gap 
 
 36. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988). 
 37. In the Fourth Amendment area, the Court has limited the scope of individual privacy recog-
nized in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967).  See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 41–43 (1988) (ruling that citizens have no expectation of privacy in trash left for public collec-
tion); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (deciding that no expectation of privacy per-
tained to privately held land, posted with no trespassing signs); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–
46 (1979) (holding that no privacy pertains to phone numbers dialed on home phone); United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (no privacy in government recorded conversations with friend, turned 
informant). 
Similarly, the Court has limited the Fifth Amendment rights in the Miranda context.  See Yarbor-
ough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 (2004) (holding that a state court need not consider a defen-
dant’s age and inexperience in determining whether the defendant was “in custody” for Miranda pur-
poses); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769–70 (2003) (stating that coercive interrogation after 
defendant was shot by police, which did not lead to prosecution, did not violate self-incrimination 
clause); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990) (holding that undercover jailhouse interrogation 
did not require Miranda warnings, as the defendant was not in “custody” for Miranda purposes); 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (ruling that no violation of self-incrimination clause oc-
curred where mentally ill defendant rendered confession, because no police coercion occurred); New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (holding that statements adduced in the interest of public 
safety were still admissible at trial, even where defendant had not been given Miranda warnings). 
The Court has imposed similar limitations on the right to counsel. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 
171–72 (2001) (stating that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is charge-specific, and that a confes-
sion obtained in violation of right to counsel on one charge can be used to prove another crime which 
the defendant has not been charged with at the time of interrogation); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 
171, 180–81 (1991) (holding asserting that right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment does not nec-
essarily assert right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 
(1973) (holding that no right to counsel attached to the showing of a photo array to a witness for iden-
tification purposes); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (stating that preindictment identification 
did not invoke Sixth Amendment protections) . 
 38. See supra note 37; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (establishing the 
good faith exception to exclusionary rule for search warrants); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 
354 (1974) (holding that the exclusionary rule is not applicable to grand jury proceedings). 
 39. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003) (cross burning); Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (internet pornography); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559–61 (1995) (gays in St. Patrick’s Day parade); R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (hate speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (flag 
burning); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 130–33 (2001). 
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between rights and remedies has grown more pronounced, a process de-
scribed as one of “remedial abridgment.”40 
The current constitutional remedial framework has its genesis in a 
pair of cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1961, Mapp v. Ohio41 and 
Monroe v. Pape.42  Mapp extended the exclusionary rule for Fourth 
Amendment violations previously imposed in federal prosecutions to all 
state prosecutions.  The remedy was viewed as “part and parcel”43 of the 
Fourth Amendment and as necessary to protect privacy interests, deter 
misconduct, and preserve judicial integrity.44  The Court would soon de-
velop similar remedial mechanisms for the enforcement of other consti-
tutional rights of suspects and criminal defendants.45 
Monroe v. Pape resurrected § 1983,46 the post–Civil War federal 
civil rights act, the statute that would quickly become the fulcrum of con-
stitutional tort litigation.  It is difficult to overstate the significance of this 
case.  Without statutory authorization, constitutional damage claims 
against state and local officials would be problematic, and a restrictive 
interpretation of § 1983 would place substantial barriers to constitutional 
litigation.  In Monroe, the police officer defendants argued that the “un-
der color of state law” provision of § 1983 limited liability to cases in 
which positive state law authorized acts that violated the Constitution.47  
Under this view, officers who acted in an unconstitutional manner, and in 
violation of state law, would not be liable under § 1983.  The Court re-
 
 40. Karlan, supra note 10, at 185.  The Supreme Court has imposed heightened culpability stan-
dards to limit the scope of constitutional protections in both its substantive and remedial jurispru-
dence.  On the substantive side of the ledger, these take the form of mental state elements for constitu-
tional torts.  Thus, the finding of a constitutional violation frequently requires a particular mental state 
of the defendant government official.  See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998) 
(requiring for substantive due process claims a showing of conduct that is so deliberately indifferent as 
to “shock the conscience,” such that a high speed chase claim can only succeed if the officer intended 
harm to result); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (requiring proof of deliberate indiffer-
ence of prison officials to state a due process claim for failure to protect from injury or assault); Hud-
son v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (requiring showing of malicious or sadistic use of force in Eighth 
Amendment claims by prisoners for excessive force); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332–33 (1986) 
(holding that negligence is insufficient to state a due process constitutional violation); Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976) (holding that race discrimination claims under Equal Protection 
Clause must be based on showing of intentional discrimination).  On the remedial side, the culpability 
standards are incorporated in immunity and governmental liability doctrine.  See infra Part IV.A.1., 
IV.A.4. 
 41. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 42. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 43. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. 
 44. Id. at 660 (“[T]he right to privacy . . . is . . . constitutional in origin . . . [and] is enforceable in 
the same manner . . . as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause . . . .”). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–38 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 467–73 (1966); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
 47. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172. 
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jected this interpretation and found an independent basis for remedies 
for acts, authorized or not by state law, that were violative of the Consti-
tution or federal law.48 
To get a sense of the different world that existed at the time Mapp 
and Monroe were decided, consider the following: 
• There were few of the landmark decisions establishing the con-
stitutional rights that we today take for granted.  Decisions 
that would protect the rights of dissidents,49 extend guarantees 
of counsel and fairness to criminal suspects,50 broaden religious 
freedoms,51 and protect racial minorities,52 women,53 gays and 
lesbians,54 the disabled,55 and the elderly56 from discrimination 
were still to be handed down. 
• While the Supreme Court had recognized a constitutionally 
based equitable cause of action against state officials (Ex parte 
Young57) there was no damages remedy for many constitu-
tional violations. 
• The civil rights acts that would protect voting,58 employment,59 
and other social rights60 were yet to be enacted by Congress. 
• There were few advocacy or litigation-oriented organizations 
that promoted civil liberties or litigated these issues in the 
courts; moreover, pre–Gideon v. Wainwright, defender offices 
and civil legal services were almost nonexistent.61 
• There was virtually no civil rights litigation.  In 1961, a grand 
total of 150 nonprisoner civil rights suits were filed for the en-
tire nation.62  By contrast, in 1998, 42,354 of such suits were 
filed.63 
 
 48. Id. at 192. 
 49. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 50. See, e.g., Gideon v. Washington, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 51. See, e.g., Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 52. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 53. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 54. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 55. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
 56. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
 57. 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908). 
 58. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973 (2004). 
 59. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–e-17 (2004)). 
 60. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 83 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 3605 (2004)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2004)). 
 61. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964); Stephen B. Bright, Gideon’s Reality: After 
Four Decades, Where Are We?, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2003, at 5. 
 62. See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the “Unhappy History” Theory 
of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 BYU L. REV. 737, 738 n.9. 
 63. EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 170. 
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From a civil rights standpoint, the landscape was quite barren, but 
the seeds of change in the Mapp and Monroe decisions would soon take 
root.64  Over the next two decades, the Court made available the reme-
dies under § 1983 against state actors to federal agents by recognizing an 
implied constitutional cause of action,65 interpreting the standing doc-
trine to provide broad access to federal courts to those injured by an un-
constitutional law or practice,66 authorizing broad forms of equitable re-
lief67 and class actions68 and permitting civil rights organizations to seek 
out clients and to promote litigation.69 
Immunity defenses were not as expansive as they are today.70  Gov-
ernmental entities became subject to liability under certain circumstances 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act,71 the doctrine of municipal liability,72 
and under certain federal civil rights statutes.  The Court also made clear 
that § 1983 had broad compensatory and deterrent purposes.73 
Congress extended rights and remedies to large classes of persons 
with claims of discrimination based on race, sex, age, alienage and dis-
 
 64. The pre-Mapp/Monroe remedial jurisprudence was not entirely lacking in enforcement pro-
visions.  Federal courts had exercised general federal jurisdictional powers to enforce rights under the 
doctrine from Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), permitting injunctive suits against state officials 
notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, and state courts were required to provide some relief on 
certain constitutional claims.  See Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally 
Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77 (1997).  However, prior to the modern era, these cases in-
volved primarily tax and property claims, and prior to Brown v. Board of Education, there were only 
isolated cases protecting liberty interests in the context of affirmative civil litigation.  First Amend-
ment jurisprudence was developed in large part in criminal proceedings.  See, e.g., Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Herndon v. 
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). 
 65. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). 
 66. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737–38 (1972); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156–57 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968). 
 67. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 821 
(1974); Frank Askin, Two Visions of Justice: Federal Courts at a Crossroads, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 63 (1995).  At the same time, the Court restricted access to federal courts under the ab-
stention doctrine.  See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447–48 (1977); Younger v. Harris, 401 
U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971). 
 68. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58–59 (1991); Franks v. Bowman Transp. 
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779–80 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 
1318, 1326 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 69. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431–32 (1978); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 
(1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444–45 (1963). 
 70. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20–23 (1980) (extending Bivens to Eighth Amend-
ment claims, notwithstanding right to recovery under Federal Tort Claims Act); Wood v. Strickland, 
420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975) (holding that an officer is entitled to qualified immunity where she acts in 
good faith and where the law is not clearly established); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 557 (1967) 
(requiring officer to show good faith and probable cause for qualified immunity). 
 71. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2000).  Under § 2680(h), the United States is liable for the inten-
tional torts of assault, false imprisonment, false arrest and malicious prosecution committed by federal 
law enforcement officials. 
 72. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 382–83 (1989); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 
U.S. 622, 657 (1980); Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 (1978). 
 73. Owen, 445 U.S. at 650–52 (1980). 
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abilities.74  Early decisions provided individuals with implied causes of 
action to sue to enforce these acts and related administrative regula-
tions.75 
There were important developments as well on the issue of access to 
the courts.  The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 197676 pro-
vided indispensable support for civil rights litigation and, with the expan-
sion of legal services, defender, public interest and advocacy organiza-
tions, individuals had far broader access to the courts.  Moreover, as 
defender and legal services lawyers migrated to the private sector, some 
brought with them the tools and motivation to litigate civil rights cases.  
Government agencies could also seek to protect rights by enforcement 
actions, internal disciplinary proceedings and, in serious cases, by prose-
cution of offending officials under criminal civil rights statutes.77  In too 
many instances, however, these measures were more theoretical than 
real. 
The Court also expanded appellate and habeas corpus rights of de-
fendants to provide multilayered review and relief from unconstitutional 
convictions and illegal enforcement practices,78 and adopted remedies for 
violations of a variety of constitutional rights in the criminal prosecution 
context.79 
These developments led to a significant surge in civil rights litiga-
tion.80  However, as the numbers of cases and expertise of lawyers in-
creased, the Court (and later, Congress) reacted by limiting access to the 
courts and abridging remedies in a number of critical areas.  Civil rights 
litigation appeared to be robust, but beneath the surface a strong cross-
current of retrenchment was developing.  Today, in many cases there is 
 
 74. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000) (age discrimi-
nation); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (employment discrimination); Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2000) (housing discrimination); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000) (discrimination against people with disabilities). 
 75. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667, 709 (1979) (inferring cause of action under Title 
IX); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) (inferring private cause of action under Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). 
 77. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242 (2000). 
 78. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 399–400 (1985); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 440–41 (1963). 
 79. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (ineffective assistance of coun-
sel); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972) (speedy trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(right to counsel); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (prosecution’s duty to disclose excul-
patory evidence). 
 80. See EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 170 (comparing 287 civil rights suits filed in 1960 in federal 
district court with 42,354 nonprisoner civil rights suits in 1998).  These numbers have provoked a de-
bate as to whether there has been a “flood” of constitutional tort cases.  See, e.g., Harry A. Blackmun, 
Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade 
Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1985); Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under § 1983: Municipal 
Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503, 1519–20 (1999); Michael G. Collins, 
“Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 
1493–97 (1989); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 
72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642–45 (1987); Woolhandler, supra note 64, at 79–81. 
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either no available remedy or partial remedies that are so encumbered 
by procedural barriers as to amount to no actual remedy.  Even more dis-
quieting is the fact that in an increasing number of cases the availability 
of remedies is now tied to standards of proof that are extra-constitutional 
in nature.  Monroe rejected the argument that § 1983 requires a showing 
of intentional misconduct,81 but immunity and municipal liability doc-
trines have been formulated to create a heightened mens rea for consti-
tutional claims.82  I discuss below the troubling ramifications of a system 
where remedies are dependent upon a showing of both a constitutional 
violation and an additional level of culpable conduct by the governmen-
tal actor or entity.83 
IV. THE LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIES 
The courts, legislators, and commentators are in substantial dis-
agreement on the necessary elements of a fair and effective remedial 
scheme.  In making judgments in this area, one must differentiate among 
different types of civil rights claims to understand the interplay of crimi-
nal and civil remedies and to focus on the interests affected by various 
remedial measures.  The possibility of money damages and equitable 
remedies, individual and governmental liability, civil and criminal pro-
ceedings, individual and class actions, state and federal forums, and in-
ternal or administrative sanctions presents a complex matrix of remedial 
measures. 
In my view, a fair remedial structure should provide (1) effective 
deterrence of governmental misconduct, (2) compensation to individuals 
for violations of their constitutional or statutory rights, and (3) enforce-
ment mechanisms that ensure compliance with constitutional and statu-
tory norms.84  Of course, these broadly stated normative standards do not 
answer the difficult questions of how to select and choose among reme-
dies, how best to structure a system that provides access to courts and 
counsel consistent with constitutional and prudential limitations on 
“cases and controversies,” and how to protect against possible overdeter-
 
 81. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); cf. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335–36 (1986) (holding that 
merely negligent acts by prison officials do not implicate the Due Process Clause). 
 82. See Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 125–35 
(1999); Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Dis-
torted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REV. 517, 523–32 (1987). 
 83. See infra Part IV. 
 84. Adjudication of rights also serves expressive process interests.  Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra 
note 10, at 1736: 
We argue that two principles, each capable of accommodating competing values in its own 
way, underlie the law of constitutional remedies.  The first principle, which is strong but not al-
ways unyielding, calls for effective redress to individual victims of constitutional violations.  The 
second, more absolute principle demands a general structure of constitutional remedies adequate 
to keep government within the bounds of law.  Under these two principles, the Constitution typi-
cally allows the substitution of one remedy for another, and sometimes tolerates situations in 
which individual victims receive no effective redress. 
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rence or other negative effects on governmental functions.85  However, if 
we start with the premise of “for every right a remedy,” there should be a 
strong presumption in favor of historically recognized forms of reme-
dies—damages, equitable relief, and governmental administrative en-
forcement of statutory rights. 
The erosion of remedial measures over the past twenty-five years 
reflects hostility to substantive constitutional and statutory rights and 
creates very different worlds of rights in theory and in practice.  By the 
steady adoption of remedial limitations, the Court and Congress have ef-
fected a significant cutback in civil rights at the operational level while 
avoiding the controversy that would be provoked by the direct abroga-
tion of constitutional and statutory rights. 
Not every remedy must be available in each case to achieve these 
goals, but the absence of any remedy for unconstitutional conduct in a 
significant numbers of cases will operate to deprive individuals of redress 
for injuries suffered, and, more significantly, will signal a tolerance of un-
constitutional practices that will erode the structure of governmental ac-
countability and respect for civil rights and civil liberties.  Even more 
troublesome, if remedies are denied on the theory that officials who vio-
late rights have acted reasonably, in some circumstances officials may 
conform their conduct to the sub-constitutional norms reflected in the 
reasonable, but illegal conduct that the courts have immunized.86 
Commentators consistently promote a system of “substitutability” 
of remedies,87 and the Court regularly invokes the alternative remedy ra-
tionale when it refuses requested remedial measures.88  Over the years, 
however, as the full scope of remedial limitations has unfolded, the no-
tion of alternatives or substitutes that can effectively serve the purpose of 
the principal remedy that has been foreclosed, has the appearance of a 
“shell game.”  Alternatives are promised, but they are often denied, un-
available in practice, or riddled with exceptions that seriously undermine 
 
 85. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1366–67 (1953) (stating that Congress has the power 
to choose among a range of remedies); see also Amar, supra note 10, at 1491 n.262: 
Unlike other legal rights created and subject to qualification, modification, and limitation by 
government, constitutional rights derive from a higher source than government itself.  Their very 
purpose is to keep government honest.  Thus, absent a clear statement by the People in the Con-
stitution itself, the document should not be read to create gaps between right and remedy ma-
nipulable by government. 
 86. See infra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
 87. See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1787; Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 
10, at 71–82. 
 88. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 306, 376 (2001) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (observing that states, even though not subject to a suit brought by an individual, may be 
subject to a suit brought by the federal government); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (same); 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111–13 (1983) (denying injunctive relief, but asserting that 
plaintiff can sue for damages); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (“[S]afeguards built into 
the judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling un-
constitutional conduct.”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428–29 (1976) (absolute prosecutorial 
immunity leaves open professional sanctions, criminal prosecution, and criminal procedural remedies). 
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their effectiveness.  There are significant categories of deprivations that 
are fully insulated from judicial relief, and which create large holes in the 
protective constitutional fabric. 
The Court is inclined to provide some form of relief for egregious 
and intentional violations of rights, but less serious violations are likely 
to be immunized, not subject to equitable remedies, or swept into the ex-
panding universe of exceptions to criminal procedural remedies.  Fur-
ther, the Court seems content to restrain government in the future:  de-
nial of individual redress is frequently justified in civil and criminal cases 
on the assumption that a court’s declaration of controlling constitutional 
principles in cases where no relief is provided will be a sufficient guide-
post to future governmental actors.  While this theory of “wealth trans-
fer” to future generations works with respect to declarations of certain 
rights,89 this process does not assure protection of all rights, even in the 
future. 
A. Damages 
Money damages for losses incurred by wrongful conduct is a well-
established remedy.  Violations of constitutional rights can result in sig-
nificant losses and damages provide both compensation and a means of 
deterrence.  Moreover, in most cases it will be, as it was in Bivens, “dam-
ages or nothing,”90 since the wrongful conduct provides no predicate for 
equitable remedies, criminal sanctions, administrative enforcement 
measures, or criminal procedural remedies.  In theory, Monroe and 
Bivens make monetary damages available for all constitutional violations 
(as well as many statutory infringements).  In practice, however, the 
Court has constructed a set of remedial limitations grounded in an ex-
pansive view of immunities and a “rebalancing” of the constitutional cal-
culus that impose high—and in many cases insurmountable—barriers to 
recovery. 
1. Absolute Immunity from Suit for Judges and Prosecutors 
Judicial immunity is very broad in scope, protecting a judge from 
suit for damages for judicial acts unless she acted with a complete lack of 
jurisdiction.91  Prosecutorial immunity extends to all actions taken by a 
prosecutor within his prosecutorial discretion.92  Accordingly, a broad 
 
 89. See Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 9, at 107–10. 
 90. 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 91. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–57 (1978). 
 92. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273–76 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428–
31 (1976); see Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. 
REV. 629, 668 (1972).  This immunity is limited specifically to the prosecutorial actions taken in an 
advocate’s capacity.  See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125–27 (1997) (reiterating that absolute im-
munity only attaches to advocacy, not to investigation or administration); Genzler v. Longanbach, 384 
F.3d 1092, 1104–05 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds be-
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spectrum of unconstitutional conduct by judges and prosecutors, which 
can have severe consequences for persons charged with a crime, is im-
mune from damages lawsuits, and is rarely subject to equitable relief, 
administrative sanctions, or criminal prosecution. 
The justifications for absolute immunity are premised on the role of 
judges and prosecutors in the criminal process.  These include the fear of 
groundless and potentially harassing suits by criminal defendants, the 
availability of other remedies, including reversal of convictions tainted by 
misconduct, and the concern that officials’ exposure to damages would 
make it less likely that a court would find a constitutional violation.93  
With respect to prosecutorial immunity, the Court has stated: 
This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which 
compel civil immunity for certain governmental officials also place 
them beyond the reach of the criminal law.  Even judges, cloaked 
with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished crimi-
nally for willful deprivations of constitutional rights on the strength 
of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal analog of § 1983.  The prosecutor 
would fare no better for his willful acts.  Moreover, a prosecutor 
stands perhaps unique, among officials whose acts could deprive 
persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to professional 
discipline by an association of his peers.94 
Justice White would have rejected absolute immunity for failure to 
disclose exculpatory evidence.95  He believed that immunity would “dis-
courage precisely the disclosure of evidence sought to be encouraged by 
the rule granting prosecutors immunity from defamation suits.”96  Ex-
perience over the past thirty years has validated these concerns.  Re-
peated instances of serious prosecutorial misconduct demonstrate that 
the “alternative remedies” have not been effective, and there has been 
little in the way of professional or other sanctions.97  For obvious reasons, 
 
cause manufacture and suppression of evidence took place so early in the process that it was investiga-
tion rather than advocacy). 
 93. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426–29. 
 94. Id. at 429 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 95. See id. at 438. 
 96. Id. at 443. 
 97. An Innocence Project study found that in exonerations involving prosecutorial misconduct, 
thirty-seven percent of the cases concerned suppression of exculpatory evidence.  See Innocence Pro-
ject, Police Misconduct, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/policemisconduct.php; see 
also Andrea Elliott & Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors Err, Others Pay the Price, N. Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 21, 2004, at 125.  Recent studies involving DNA exoneration and systemic faults in the criminal 
justice system have reported numerous and serious cases of prosecutorial misconduct.  See, e.g., JIM 
DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246 (2000); OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF ILLINOIS, REPORT OF 
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/ 
commission_report/; Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules (June 26, 2003), available at http://www. 
publicintegrity.org/pm/default.aspx?sid=main (charges dismissed or convictions reversed in over 2,000 
cases from 1970–2003 for prosecutorial misconduct). 
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criminal prosecutions of prosecutors are almost never undertaken.98  Dis-
ciplinary sanctions are just as rarely imposed.  As Professor Richard 
Rosen concluded in a study of this process: 
The results of this research demonstrate that despite the universal 
adoption by the states of Disciplinary Rules prohibiting prosecuto-
rial suppression of exculpatory evidence and falsification of evi-
dence, and despite numerous reported cases showing violations of 
these rules, disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and 
meaningful sanctions rarely applied.  The result is a disciplinary sys-
tem that, on its face, appears to be a deterrent to prosecutorial mis-
conduct, but which has had its salutary impact seriously weakened 
by a failure of enforcement.99 
It is true that constitutional violations that prejudice a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial are grounds for reversal of convictions.  However, the 
combination of the prejudice element for many constitutional viola-
tions,100 the expansive application of the harmless error doctrine,101 and 
the limits on federal habeas relief102 have insulated many convictions 
against reversal, even where prosecutors have committed intentional vio-
lations.103 
 
 98. See Kamin, supra note 10, at 81–82 n.291 (noting that only two prosecutors have been prose-
cuted for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence (both dismissed pretrial) and in entire 20th century 
only six prosecutors convicted for courtroom misconduct). 
 99. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper 
Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987).  Similar findings are reported by BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 14-9 to 14-10, 14-12 to 14-20 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that contempt 
citations, frequently used against defense counsel, “[are] rarely used to punish prosecutors”; naming a 
prosecutor in appellate opinions reversing a conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct is the clear 
exception; and, sanctions by disciplinary committees are “infrequent.”  In Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 
(1967), the Court reversed a conviction where the prosecutor had led a jury to believe that the defen-
dant’s clothing was smeared with blood, that he knew to be red paint, but the Illinois Bar Association 
grievance committee refused to recommend discipline.  Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct, supra note 
92, at 671–72; see also Kamin, supra note 10, at 82 n.291 (citing Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, 
Prosecution on Trial in DuPage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, at 1) (noting that of 381 cases in the previ-
ous thirty-six years in which a case was reversed because a prosecutor withheld or falsified evidence, 
only two had led to criminal prosecutions of the district attorneys and in both cases, the charges were 
dismissed prior to trial, and concluding that only six prosecutors had been convicted in the twentieth 
century for their courtroom misconduct).  The Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000), permits a 
court to order the government to pay a defendant’s counsel fees for “vexatious, frivolous, or bad faith” 
prosecutions.  See, e.g., United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 
No. 04-2, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 6553 (Oct. 4, 2004). 
 100. See infra note 347 and accompanying text. 
 101. See infra notes 342–54 and accompanying text. 
 102. See infra notes 325–41 and accompanying text. 
 103. Criminal prosecutions of governmental officials are not a realistic alternative.  See PAUL 
CHERIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE, 101 (1995): 
Criminal prosecution is the most cumbersome tool for the accountability of officials.  As an in-
strument for policy, it presents the difficulties with disciplinary proceedings writ large:  the 
charges are made after the fact; it is a matter of hazard which cases can be proved and which can-
not; and because the burden of proof is extremely high, the likelihood of success is small.  Prose-
cutions are brought in the few cases where the evidence happens to be available, and the results 
thus create a patchy deterrent; they may have no effect on police policy at all if police executives 
do not agree with the decision to prosecute.  Furthermore, the standards of the criminal law usu-
ally cannot delineate what is good police work that will minimize the unnecessary use of force—
that must be shaped by police regulations, training, and practice. 
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Moreover, developments in constitutional litigation since Imbler v. 
Pachtman104 provide adequate protections for prosecutors without the 
need for absolute immunity.  First, as discussed below, the qualified im-
munity doctrine protects from liability any act that a reasonable officer 
could believe to be lawful.  Under this doctrine, where the law or facts 
were not previously sufficiently developed to make clear to an official 
that her acts would be unlawful, there is immunity from damage claims.105  
Second, the Supreme Court has foreclosed most suits by criminal defen-
dants alleging violations in their prosecutions unless they first are suc-
cessful in obtaining a dismissal or acquittal on the criminal charges.106 
In its early decisions on prosecutorial immunity, the Court assumed 
that alternative restraints on prosecutors would provide sufficient deter-
rence.107  There is now good reason to believe that remedies other than 
reversal of convictions are illusory and that prosecutors are not subject to 
any meaningful external restraints on their vast discretionary powers.108  
Moreover, because more than ninety percent of all sentences spring from 
plea bargains at the federal level,109 rather than trials, prosecutorial con-
duct is subject to little judicial oversight in the great majority of cases.  
Even if civil remedies or disciplinary proceedings were available, prose-
cutorial misconduct in the context of plea bargaining would be extremely 
difficult to prove due to lack of an official record.  Moreover, the most 
common form of prosecutorial misconduct—failure to produce exculpa-
tory evidence—is often an undocumented event.110  Only if the evidence 
 
 104. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
 105. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 106. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). 
 107. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428–29 (“We emphasize that the immunity of prosecutors from liability in 
suits under § 1983 does not leave the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which 
occurs.”). 
 108. As originally defined, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity did not foreclose suits 
against judges for injunctive or declaratory relief.  In such actions, an award of attorney’s fees could be 
made against judicial defendants.  Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 543–44 (1984).  However, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and § 1988(b), now prohibit an award of injunctive relief “in any action brought against a judi-
cial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory de-
cree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable” and preclude an award of attorney’s fees for 
“any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial ca-
pacity . . . unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.” 
 109. See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline 
Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275 (2004). 
 110. Bennett Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 313 n.14 
(Winter 2001) (listing sources showing the frequency of suppression of evidence by prosecutors and its 
role in wrongful convictions).  According to the Innocence Project, suppression or destruction of evi-
dence is the most common form of prosecutorial misconduct leading to wrongful convictions.  See 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/policemisconduct.php. Systemic review of all death penalty 
cases reversed upon appeal revealed that suppression of evidence by prosecutorial misconduct was the 
second most common cause of reversal, comprising 16–19% of all causes for reversal.  See James S. 
Liebman & Jeffrey Fagan, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, at 5 (2000), 
available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman.  A similar study revealed that 
out of 350 wrongful convictions for capital-grade crimes, 50 stemmed from prosecutorial misconduct, 
35 of which included suppression of exculpatory evidence.  Hugo Adam Bedeau & Michael L. 
Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 173–79 tbl.6 (1987). 
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is discovered by other means can its suppression be challenged.  The net 
effect of absolute immunity and lack of oversight is to create an envi-
ronment of impunity. 
2. Qualified Immunity 
This defense has become a primary means of denying damages to 
individuals who have suffered a violation of their constitutional rights.  
Under a test that protects governmental officers if the law was not 
“clearly established” at the time of the violation, the court must deter-
mine whether in light of the facts of the case, the contours of the right 
were clearly enough established so that a reasonable officer would know 
that his conduct was violative of the Constitution.111 
On one level, the doctrine is not controversial:  where a wholly 
novel right is recognized or where doctrinal development was not fore-
seeable, it would be unfair to hold an individual officer liable in damages.  
Early immunity decisions made this point and provided protection in 
such situations.112  But the Court has extended the doctrine to immunize 
conduct that violates plainly foreseeable decisions,113 and has ruled that 
qualified immunity protects all but the “plainly incompetent” or those 
who intentionally violate rights.114  And while the Court has modified its 
approach at times, holding that prior case law that gives “fair notice” of a 
right is sufficient to defeat qualified immunity,115 the doctrine often de-
nies damages for serious violations.116 
Qualified immunity jurisprudence is highly result-oriented and 
prone to judicial manipulation.  It is impossible to reconcile the hundreds 
of appellate opinions, and even within judicial circuits the results are of-
ten inconsistent.117  Recent case law from the Fourth Circuit provides 
 
 111. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982); Brown, supra note 80, at 1507. 
 112. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S 547, 555 (1967). 
 113. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207–08 (2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 
(1987). 
 114. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).  To the degree that qualified immunity limits li-
ability to “intentional” deprivations, the doctrine provides an end-run around Monroe v. Pape which 
had held that § 1983 has no state of mind component.  365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (“We construed that 
word in its setting to mean the doing of an act with ‘a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal 
right.’  We do not think that gloss should be placed on [§ 1983] which we have here.” (citation omit-
ted)). 
 115. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 746 (2002). 
 116. See Mark R. Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen, 79 
IOWA L. REV. 273, 286 (1994); David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 54–55 
(1989).  Some courts have found that qualified immunity protects even malicious or intentional mis-
conduct.  See, e.g., Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1053 (9th Cir. 2002) (qualified 
immunity granted to prison officer whose malicious use of force violated Eighth Amendment’s prohi-
bition on cruel and unusual punishment). 
 117. The conflict in the lower courts is traceable in part to the differing standards articulated by 
the United States Supreme Court.  In some cases, the Court has ruled that qualified immunity is al-
most the norm, stating that it is available to all but the “incompetent” officer and to those who inten-
tionally violate rights.  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; Malley, 475 U.S. at 341.  In 
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some insight into the increasingly bizarre and irreconcilable results.118  In 
Robles v. Prince George’s County, police officers holding an arrestee 
wanted in another county, but not willing to wait for officers to pick him 
up, handcuffed the detainee to a pole in the middle of a deserted shop-
ping center parking lot at 3 a.m. and then notified the other jurisdiction 
where he could be located.119  The court had little difficulty determining 
that this action had no valid law enforcement purpose and thus was viola-
tive of the Constitution, but quite inexplicably ruled that the officers 
were entitled to qualified immunity since no court had previously pro-
scribed this kind of misconduct.120  It is difficult to believe that the Court 
did not understand that the lack of a controlling precedent was a function 
of the truly unprecedented illegality. 
Similarly, in Parrish v. Cleveland,121 the Fourth Circuit granted 
qualified immunity, notwithstanding established law that prohibited the 
conduct in question.  There, the defendant transported a highly intoxi-
cated individual, who had already suffered bouts of vomiting, and who 
was left unattended and not observable in the back of a police wagon 
with his head covered by a “spit-mask” designed to trap fluids from the 
mouth and nose.122  The court of appeals ruled that the officers had quali-
fied immunity from suit, where the plaintiff’s death from suffocation re-
sulted from the forcible application of this mask.123  Questionable deci-
sions abound in this area.124 
 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibited police 
from inviting the media to “ride along” and be present at the execution of search warrants, but further 
held that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability even though the Court was unani-
mous on the Fourth Amendment issue and there was no judicial support for such conduct.  Id. at 614–
15.  According to the Court, a reasonable officer would not know that the conduct was illegal in the 
absence of specific judicial rulings on the issue.  Id. at 617–18.  In other cases, the Court has ruled that 
the lack of precedent is not always a basis for qualified immunity.  In Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 
(2002), the Court rejected qualified immunity for prison officials who had restrained a prisoner to a 
“hitching post” as a disciplinary punishment, and denied him water and bathroom access.  The lack of 
precedent did not mandate immunity: 
Our opinion in Lanier thus makes clear that officials can still be on notice that their conduct vio-
lates established law even in novel factual circumstances.  Indeed, in Lanier, we expressly rejected 
a requirement that previous cases be “fundamentally similar.”  Although earlier cases involving 
“fundamentally similar” facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law 
is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding.  The same is true of cases with 
“materially similar” facts.  Accordingly, pursuant to Lanier, the salient question that the Court of 
Appeals ought to have asked is whether the state of the law in 1995 gave respondents fair warning 
that their alleged treatment of Hope was unconstitutional. 
Id. at 741. 
 118. Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2004) (Luttig, J., dissenting); Robles v. Prince 
George’s County, 302 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 119. Robles 302 F.3d at 266–67. 
 120. Id. at 271. 
 121. Parrish, 372 F.3d at 309–10. 
 122. Id. at 297–300. 
 123. Id. at 309–10.  In his dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in Robles, 308 F.3d at 446, 
Judge Luttig pointed to “clearly established law” in the state that would reject qualified immunity.  In 
Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F. 3d 731, 741–42 (4th Cir. 2003), the court held, contrary to Robles, that offi-
cers should have known they were violating the constitutional rights of an allegedly suicidal person by 
taking him involuntarily into custody for psychological evaluation.  See also Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of 
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Defenders of the doctrine of qualified immunity recognize its broad 
reach and, in the words of one commentator, the “huge” right-remedy 
gap that is created along with the “societal loss in under enforced consti-
tutional norms.”125  Still, they find that the doctrine is necessary (1) to 
protect officers who have to make “difficult” legal judgments, (2) to pre-
vent overdeterrence by avoiding strict liability, and (3) to encourage 
courts to announce new constitutional principles they might otherwise 
reject.126 
The rationales for the doctrine are seriously overstated.  First, there 
is no strict liability in constitutional tort litigation.  Strict liability would 
permit damages based on a showing of injury and causation,127 but all 
constitutional claims require a showing of culpable conduct.  For exam-
ple, a search is not illegal simply because it turns up no contraband; 
rather, the officer seeking a warrant need only have a “fair probability” 
of finding contraband.128  Nor would an innocent person convicted of a 
crime have a civil remedy following her exoneration unless she could 
 
Corr., 349 F. 3d 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (vacating an order of qualifying immunity and remanding a case in 
which corrections officers deliberately ignored an inmates plea for protection against assault by an-
other inmate). 
 124. See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 2003) (strip search of students violates 
Fourth Amendment, but not sufficiently “egregious” to defeat qualified immunity); Cruz v. Kauai 
County, 279 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The right violated here . . . was the Fourth Amendment 
right not to have a prosecutor, in order to obtain a bail revocation, personally attest to a false state-
ment of a biased source with no investigation of the statement’s truth or falsity.  Unfortunately for [the 
plaintiff], he has not cited any case that establishes such a right, nor is it self-evident.”); Butera v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (confidential informant’s constitutional right to 
protection by the District of Columbia from third-party violence was not clearly established); Trulock 
v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403–04 (4th Cir. 2001) (granting qualified immunity to officers who searched 
plaintiff’s password-protected computer files without a warrant, concluding that, “[a]lthough cases 
involving computers are not sui generis, the law of computers is fast evolving, and we are reluctant to 
recognize a retroactive right based on cases involving footlockers and other dissimilar objects”); 
Brown v. Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 592 (5th Cir. 1999) (innocent third parties injured by law 
enforcement sting operations “run amok” not entitled to compensation); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 
1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (ruling no clearly established duty of police officer to intervene to prevent 
fellow officer from fabricating a confession); Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[O]ur 
review of the record shows that Rivera is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity based on the 
undisputed fact that the Petta children alleged purely psychological harm as a result of Rivera’s ac-
tions.  At the time of these events, it was not ‘clearly established’ in our law that such nonphysical 
harm gave rise to a constitutional tort.”); White v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 31 F. Supp. 2d 953, 
954 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (“The Eleventh Circuit leads the parade when it comes to the recognition of 
‘qualified immunity’ as virtually perfect insulation for individuals from § 1983 liability.”); cf. O’Rourke 
v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1210 (11th Cir. 2004) (denying qualified immunity to officers who acted with 
the “unbridled arrogance of those who believe they will never be held accountable for their behav-
ior”). 
 125. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 9, at 89–90; see also Jeffries, Eleventh Amend-
ment, supra note 10, at 75–76.  Professor Jeffries has presented thoughtful arguments in favor of cer-
tain limitations on remedies, but he has been careful to note that current restrictions on damages are 
“extravagant” and that the Court has been “requiring too much fault as a condition of constitutional 
tort liability.”  Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 9, at 91. 
 126. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 9, at 113; see also SCHUCK, SUING 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 10, at 59–81 (setting forth damages of “over-deterrence” of governmental 
officers). 
 127. Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 10, at 71. 
 128. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983). 
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prove culpable conduct of a state official.129  Constitutional law is no 
more indeterminate than other legal rules and standards and, as noted 
below, early immunity doctrine protected officers where legal standards 
changed after the officers acted.130 
Second, the argument that qualified immunity is needed to permit 
the development of constitutional law, while of some surface appeal, is 
ultimately unpersuasive.  Professor Jeffries argues that without the pro-
tections afforded by qualified immunity, the Court would be hesitant to 
recognize new constitutional principles or to expand existing rights.131  In 
support of this theory, he claims that decisions like Brown,132 Mapp,133 
Miranda,134 and United States v. Wade,135 would not have been possible if 
money damages were available or if the new constitutional rules were to 
be applied retroactively.  Further, he claims that cases like Paul v. 
Davis,136 resulted in a “cramped, illiberal view of protected ‘liberty,’”137 
because of the Court’s concerns about officer liability and the possibility 
that the Fourteenth Amendment would become a “font of tort law.”138 
Nonretroactivity of “new” constitutional decisions, like Mapp and 
Miranda, where thousands of convictions would otherwise have been re-
versed, is essential to the growth of constitutional law.  But that proposi-
tion is not equally applicable to civil litigation.  Early qualified immunity 
doctrine provided protection from liability where a court decision 
amounted to “new” constitutional law.139  And, settled retroactivity law 
for civil claims provides a fair level of protection to defendants from un-
foreseeable legal developments.140  There is a critical difference between 
protecting officers from liability under new or otherwise unforeseeable 
decisions and protecting them from liability on a standard that requires 
the plaintiff to show that the constitutional right was already “clearly es-
tablished.”141  Further, the retroactivity of decisions is limited by statutes 
 
 129. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits liability against municipalities in cases where a right is first recog-
nized, but even in that context, the plaintiff must prove culpable conduct of the individual officer or 
the municipality.  See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635–36 (1980). 
 130. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). 
 131. Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 10, at 78; Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap, supra 
note 9, at 95–102. 
 132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 133. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 134. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 135. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 136. 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (holding that defamation of citizen by police chief not actionable as 
a due process violation without a showing of tangible loss). 
 137. Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 10, at 78. 
 138. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. 
 139. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557–58 (1967). 
 140. See Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105–08 (1971) (“the decision to be applied nonretro-
actively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which liti-
gants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly fore-
shadowed” (citation omitted)). 
 141. With respect to the school desegregation litigation, damages would have been precluded un-
der even limited qualified immunity principles given that previous precedent was directly overruled in 
Brown.  However, it may well be that a potential damages remedy for the thousands of students de-
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of limitations, the Heck v. Humphrey doctrine requiring a convicted de-
fendant to secure reversal of his conviction prior to filing a civil rights 
suit where the claim would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [the] con-
viction or sentence,”142 the practical realities regarding access to counsel, 
knowledge of claims, and access to the courts,143 and the fact that the cur-
rent Supreme Court is not in the business of recognizing many new con-
stitutional rights. 
Professor Jeffries’s assertion that it is “almost inconceivable that 
Paul would have come out the same way had injunctive relief been the 
only remedy,”144 does not account for the fact that Paul is consistent with 
the Rehnquist Court’s limited view of liberty and privacy interests.145  In-
deed, even with the expansive qualified immunity doctrine, the Court 
continues to reject plausible constitutional claims.146  The Court’s immu-
nity law is but one facet of a constitutional jurisprudence which is 
marked by limits on damage remedies, equitable relief, and substantive 
rights.  And, if the Court is not willing to recognize rights where an offi-
cer would be left holding the “tab,” the easy resolution would be to per-
mit recovery against the municipal employer on a respondeat superior 
basis.147  This would place the burden of payment on the government 
and, in turn, act as an incentive to implement measures aimed at reduc-
ing future violations. 
Third, and most important, this doctrine does more than deprive 
victims of compensation for proven constitutional violations.  It operates 
as well to establish a sub-constitutional standard for future government 
conduct.  In Anderson v. Creighton the Court ruled that language in the 
Fourth Amendment proscribing unreasonable searches and seizures did 
not preclude the possibility that an officer can act in an objectively rea-
 
nied access to desegregated schools in the years following Brown would have been a useful tool in 
combating the “massive resistance” tactics of recalcitrant school officials. 
 142. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 
 143. Notwithstanding the growth of civil rights organizations, a more rigorous civil rights bar, and 
a broader societal understanding of constitutional protections, access to courts for civil rights claimants 
is limited by the relatively small number of lawyers with the experience and resources to litigate these 
cases, racial and class characteristics that tend to prejudice juries against the plaintiffs, and the restric-
tions on damages that make the cases unattractive to counsel.  See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
The Supreme Court and Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 787–90 (1970). 
 144. Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 10, at 79. 
 145. See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991) (holding that the Constitution does not 
protect a “liberty” interest in reputation); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (holding that transfer 
between prisons does not implicate a validly convicted prisoner’s liberty interests); Laird v. Tatum, 408 
U.S. 1, 9–10 (1972) (holding that petitioner did not have standing to challenge certain government sur-
veillance programs). 
 146. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1998) (declining to impose 
liability for high speed police pursuits unless officer acted with conscience shocking culpability 
amounting to an intent to harm); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
199–200 (1989) (holding that county and state owe no affirmative duty to protect persons from even 
foreseeable harm unless they are in custody or subjected to restraints on liberty). 
 147. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430–31 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting respondeat superior liability for municipalities). 
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sonable fashion even though in violation of the Fourth Amendment.148  
The Court noted that determinations of probable cause are often quite 
difficult and that officials should be held liable in damages only where 
their conduct was clearly proscribed.149  But, as Chief Judge Newman has 
noted: 
It is not readily apparent how a police officer could have an objec-
tively reasonable belief that conduct was lawful when the unlawful-
ness of that conduct rests on a determination that an objectively 
reasonable police officer would not have acted.  And the situation is 
especially perplexing [where] . . . it has been determined, correctly 
in our view, that no reasonable juror could fail to find that the offi-
cer’s conduct was unlawful.150 
In the wake of Anderson, a number of circuits have routinely em-
ployed the concept of “arguable probable cause” in Fourth Amendment 
qualified immunity analysis.151  Given the fact that probable cause can be 
established on facts that show only a “fair probability” of criminal con-
duct (a “practical, nontechnical conception”),152 to permit “arguable” 
probable cause to justify a search is to degrade the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections to a very low level. 
The Court has provided officers with a similarly broad immunity 
from damages where they use unreasonable force.  In Graham v. Con-
nor, the Court ruled that excessive force claims arising out of arrests, in-
vestigatory stops, or other seizures of “free citizens” are properly ana-
lyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” 
standard.153  Reasonableness is to be determined by the “facts and cir-
cumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at 
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempt-
ing to evade arrest by flight.”154  Under the objective nature of the test, 
“[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s 
 
 148. 483 U.S. 635, 640–41 (1987). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 648 (2d Cir. 1994).  But see Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 
492 n.3 (3d Cir. 1995) (“There is no conflict in saying a police officer who acted unreasonably never-
theless reasonably (but mistakenly) believed his conduct was reasonable.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ubjective intent, motive, 
or even outright animus are irrelevant in a determination of qualified immunity based on arguable 
probable cause to arrest, just as an officer’s good intent is irrelevant when he contravenes settled 
law.”); Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing “arguable probable cause” in 
the context of a qualified immunity defense); Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A re-
view of the circumstances of this case reveals that . . . the State Troopers . . . had ‘arguable’ probable 
cause). 
 152. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983). 
 153. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 391 (1989). 
 154. Id. at 396. 
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good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitu-
tional.”155 
However, in Saucier v. Katz the Supreme Court determined that 
“[t]he inquiries for qualified immunity and excessive force remain dis-
tinct.”156  Graham protects an officer who reasonably, but mistakenly, be-
lieved the circumstances justified using more force than in fact was 
needed.  The Court failed to explain how an officer could act in an objec-
tively unreasonable manner for Fourth Amendment purposes, but could 
still have reasonably believed that his conduct was lawful.  Given the in-
herent contradictions in the standards articulated by the Court, it is not 
surprising that lower courts have struggled in their application of quali-
fied immunity in the use of force context.157 
Under this qualified immunity regime, we can fully expect officers 
to apply the lesser Fourth Amendment protection of the immunity doc-
trine in their street-level decisions to arrest, search, investigate, and use 
force.  After all, if a court will demand only “arguable probable cause” 
for a search or arrest or will permit “reasonable” unreasonable force, of-
ficers will often face no sanctions for applying these sub-constitutional 
standards.  Use of force is not subject to the exclusionary rule and many 
searches, arrests, or investigative detentions yield no physical evidence. 
In theory, qualified immunity should protect officers from liability 
for a specific type of unconstitutional conduct only once:  with the right 
defined, an officer can no longer claim that it was not clearly established.  
But that is true only for the establishment of categorical rights.  Thus, po-
lice now know that they may not bring media along on the execution of 
search warrants.158  However, by extending the doctrine to protect offi-
cers who claim not that the legal standard was not clearly established—
e.g., probable cause to arrest or search—but that their specific conduct in 
the case in question was not clearly proscribed by previous decisions, the 
 
 155. Id. at 397. 
 156. 533 U.S. 194, 204 (2001). 
 157. See, e.g., McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1245 n.16 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(per curiam) (ruling that law was not clearly established that surprise use of pepper spray on a violent 
felony suspect violated Constitution); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 282 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that 
historical facts had to be resolved by jury before determination of objective reasonableness could be 
made as to officer’s shooting of a black officer mistaken for suspect); Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 
287 F.3d 492, 505 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Even if genuine issues of material fact did exist as to whether a rea-
sonable officer would have perceived an immediate threat . . . we would still find summary judgment 
to be appropriate on the basis of the ‘clearly established’ prong of the qualified immunity test.”); Rob-
inson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“The development of the law 
with respect to arrests and detentions now allows us to recognize as a general principle that pointing a 
gun to the head of an apparently unarmed suspect during an investigation can be a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, especially where the individual poses no particular danger . . . . The contours of 
that right were not at all clear in 1995, however.” (citation omitted)); Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 
1179, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We can find no substantial grounds for a reasonable officer to conclude 
that there was legitimate justification for continuing to hold the young people outside the residence 
directly at gunpoint after they had completely submitted to the SWAT deputies’ initial show of force, 
or for training a firearm directly upon a four-year old child at any time during the operation.”). 
 158. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617–18 (1999). 
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constitutional rule for that case will not control other factually distinct 
arrests or searches.  In these circumstances, deviance is defined down-
ward and officers may well continue to operate on this sub-constitutional 
level.  Professor Levinson states: 
[O]ne might doubt the extent to which governmental officials 
whose behavior is governed by constitutional law care much about 
constitutional rights except as predictors of legal risk, which is a 
function of remedies—especially in the context of criminal justice 
where there are strong normative reasons for pushing against con-
stitutional limits.159 
The claim is also made that qualified immunity is necessary to pre-
vent overdeterrence of public officials who, faced with the exposure to 
civil liability for constitutional violations, might steer clear of the consti-
tutional line and fail to fully enforce the law.160  Yet, from an opposite di-
rection, we are told that damage awards fail to achieve any meaningful 
deterrence of governmental misconduct.161  There is good reason to be 
skeptical of the claim that officers will not engage in appropriate law en-
forcement if the qualified immunity doctrine is limited to protection 
against unforeseeable constitutional developments.  Not only does cur-
rent doctrine in the highly litigated Fourth Amendment areas of law en-
forcement provide substantial room for error, but to the degree that gov-
ernment agencies believe that further protection against damages is 
warranted, it can be provided by means of indemnification by the gov-
ernmental employer.162 
Damages can play a vital role in deterring both individual and gov-
ernmental misconduct, but only if the damages assessment reflects the 
seriousness of the proven misconduct and the injuries that are suffered, 
government officials take necessary steps to reform practices and proce-
 
 159. Levinson, supra note 10, at 911.  The risk of encouraging unconstitutional conduct is en-
hanced as well by application of the objectively reasonable officer standard for the good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule and for habeas corpus review. 
 160. See SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT, supra note 10, at 180; Jeffries, The Right Remedy Gap, 
supra note 9, at 113.  In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655–56 (1980), the Court stated 
that at the “heart of [the] justification for a qualified immunity . . . is the concern that the threat of 
personal monetary liability will introduce an unwarranted and unconscionable consideration into the 
decisionmaking process, thus paralyzing the governing official’s decisiveness and distorting his judg-
ment on matters of public policy.” 
 161. See, e.g., Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective Justice and Constitutional 
Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 903, 903 (2001) (asserting that principles of justice support damage claims in 
these cases); Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police 
Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 
600 (2000) (arguing that indemnification and insurance aspects of civil rights litigation substantially 
decreases any possible deterrent effect on officer conduct); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government 
Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 415–20 
(2000) (asserting that government entities, unlike private defendants, will not normally be deterred by 
money damages, and that compensatory aspects of constitutional tort litigation may not be supported 
by various justice theories) [hereinafter Levinson, Making Government Pay]. 
 162. As noted, if protection of the officer from unwarranted imposition of damages was the real 
concern, that goal could be achieved along with compensation for wrongs committed by permitting 
respondeat superior liability against the municipality.  See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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dures that cause constitutional violations, and individual officers are 
properly disciplined, retrained and supervised as a result of findings of 
misconduct.  Some jurisdictions view money damages simply as a cost of 
doing business and, as long as the amounts that are awarded or paid by 
way of settlement do not exceed budgetary limits, the “benefits” 
achieved by aggressive policing or other governmental operations that 
result in constitutional violations are seen as worth the price.163  But this 
fact does not prove that damages cannot deter.  There are situations in 
which governmental units have changed practices and policies in the 
wake of large damage awards.164  Further, the fact that some damage 
awards have not had a deterrent effect may well be a function of the limi-
tations that courts and legislatures have imposed on damages in civil 
rights cases.165  Thus, if damages were permitted on the basis of the in-
herent value of rights (without a showing of injury or other losses) and 
punitive damages were recoverable from municipalities, it would be 
more difficult for government to consider damages simply as a cost of do-
ing business.  Surely, at some level, the cost of doing business will be 
simply too great for the municipal budget and practices will change.166 
Equally important, it is a mistake to view the issue of deterrence 
solely through the prism of damages.  Economic sanctions may not al-
ways create the incentives for reform or respect for individual rights, but 
damages in combination with other measures, for example, court-
mandated injunctive relief, judicial or legislative limitations on indemni-
fication,167 and mandatory internal sanctions against officials who inten-
tionally violate rights, have the capability of deterring future misconduct. 
There is a related point.  In the continuing debate over the role of 
constitutional tort remedies and criminal procedural limitations on law 
 
 163. See, e.g., Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra note 161, at 369. 
 164. As one example, in Philadelphia in 1996, in the wake of a police abuse scandal and the pay-
ment of several million dollars in settlements to persons who were wrongfully arrested and prosecuted 
on false narcotics charges, the City agreed to a Settlement Agreement in a federal lawsuit that man-
dated extensive changes in the operation, policies and practices of the police department (including 
computerization of almost all records and data in the department, extensive use of force reporting, 
changes in internal affairs investigative procedures, heightened supervision of narcotics law enforce-
ment, new policies to address racial profiling and unjustified stops of cars and pedestrians, and new 
hiring procedures).  See Settlement Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 96-6045 
(E.D. Pa.) (on file with author).  No single reason motivated the City to agree to this settlement, but 
the payment of significant damages and the prospect of further corruption and exposure to verdicts 
were part of the mix. 
 165. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986); Carey v. Piphus, 435 
U.S. 247, 254–55 (1978). 
 166. For commentary on the “cost of policing” approach to damage awards, see Susan Bandes, 
Patterns of Injustice: Policy Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1337–38 (noting that New 
York City paid over $31 million in settlements and judgments in 1998, but failed to take action against 
officers responsible for the misconduct); Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra note 161, at 412–
14; see also L.A. police corruption settlements estimated to reach $70 million, Associated Press, Mar. 31, 
2005, available at 3/31/05 APDATASTREAM 17:09:47 (Westlaw). 
 167. See Emery & Maazel, supra note 161, at 596–600 (advocating process by which the court ap-
portions damages according to relative culpability of official and the municipality and takes into con-
sideration ability of official to pay the judgment). 
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enforcement and other government agencies and officials, courts fre-
quently assert that limitations on a particular remedy are justified on the 
grounds that alternative remedies exist for both deterrence and compen-
sation.  Thus, limitations on the exclusionary rule are justified by argu-
ments that other remedies are available or can be created to fill whatever 
remedial void is created.168  Similarly, advocates of limitations on dam-
ages suggest that deterrence can be accomplished by the exclusionary 
rule or injunctive relief.169  But, the process has not been one of substitu-
tion; to the contrary, each of the remedial mechanisms has been limited.  
Thus, as I discuss below, the exclusionary rule has been substantially re-
duced in scope, the structural injunction remedy is available only under 
very limited circumstances, and damages are often precluded by immu-
nity doctrine.170 
These developments reflect a remedial “shell game” where, as dis-
crete remedies are reduced or limited, we are told that equally effective 
alternatives exist; nevertheless, when implementation of those remedies 
is at issue, the same justifications are provided for limiting those remedial 
measures.  It is not difficult to present cogent arguments as to the dis-
crete inefficiencies and adverse effects flowing from the broad applica-
tion of any specific remedial measure.  But when all remedies are re-
stricted, the right is reduced to a dead letter. 
3. Related Doctrinal Limitations on Damages 
a. Class Action Limitations 
Litigation of class action damage claims in civil rights and other tort 
contexts has become more difficult in the federal courts.171  Where plain-
 
 168. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 n.18 (1984) (creating good faith exception 
to exclusionary rule where search warrant is found defective does not leave magistrates who serve as 
“rubber stamps” in approving warrants free from other sanctions, including removal from office).  An 
early advocate of the abolition of the exclusionary rule, Chief Justice Burger stated that the abolition 
should be contingent upon an “administrative or quasi-judicial remedy against the government itself to 
afford compensation and restitution for persons whose Fourth Amendment rights have been vio-
lated.”  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422 (1971) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2001) (suppression orders should be made contingent on failure to pay fair 
damages to the defendant). 
 169. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 
(1978); cf. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 n.2 (1983).  Professor Jeffries argues that limitations 
on damages “facilitates constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation.”  Jeffries, The Right-
Remedy Gap, supra note 9, at 90.  But this theory depends on the availability of alternative remedies 
such as a viable exclusionary rule and injunctions, and a qualified immunity regime that gives the gov-
ernment only one “free bite” at a constitutional violation.  See also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 
1788 n.312; Levinson, Making Government Pay, supra note 161, at 416–19. 
 170. See infra Part VI. 
 171. The injunctive class provisions of Rule 23(b) were “designed specifically for civil rights cases 
seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief.”  Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 59 (3d Cir. 1994); see 
also Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 228 (3d Cir. 2001) (approving certification of class of arrestees 
in challenge to preliminary hearing procedures). 
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tiffs seek class certification of the damages claims under Rule 23(b)(3),172 
the questions of whether common issues predominate over differences in 
damages for individual class members and whether class certification is a 
superior means of handling the litigation have divided the courts.  In a 
number of cases, class certification has been denied on the theory that 
even where a common question exists as to liability, the assessment of 
damages for constitutional or other torts is so individualized that sepa-
rate proceedings are necessary for the damages phase.173  Some courts 
have found the class action to be a superior means of a fair and effective 
adjudication of damages claims and have adopted various procedures for 
assessing damages on a class or sub-class basis.174  In cases involving large 
numbers of potential plaintiffs, for example in the racial profiling con-
text, where individual damages tend to be modest, the refusal of courts to 
certify the damages class will render almost all claims moot, since there 
will not be the lawyers or resources sufficient to litigate the great major-
ity of the individual claims. 
b. Exhaustion of Remedies 
While the general rule is that a § 1983 plaintiff need not exhaust 
administrative or state law remedies, there are significant exceptions.  In 
Heck v. Humphrey, the Court ruled: 
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district 
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; 
if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been in-
validated [e.g., “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive 
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a 
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance 
of a writ of habeas corpus.”]175 
Many civil rights claims presented by persons subject to state crimi-
nal prosecutions are barred under Heck’s rationale, absent an acquittal 
 
 172. FED. R. CIV. P. 23b(3). 
 173. See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 192 (3d Cir. 
2001) (denying class certification in securities litigation); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 
F.3d 1228, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying class certification in case alleging discrimination in car rental 
practices); Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1004–05 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying class 
certification on claims of racial discrimination); White v. Williams, 179 F. Supp. 2d 405, 421 (D.N.J. 
2002) (denying class certification on claim of racial profiling on New Jersey Turnpike). 
 174. See, e.g., Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (sustaining district court certifi-
cation of damages class in case alleging unconstitutional strip searches at jails and prisons); Robinson 
v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162–63 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting damages class to 
proceed in racial discrimination case, and suggesting procedures for assessing damages); Ingram v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 700–01 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (approving settlement of racial discrimination 
class action ); Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 387–88 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (certifying damages 
class in case alleging system wide sex discrimination). 
 175. 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). 
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or dismissal of the state charges.176  This is true even though the state 
court might have determined that a violation of rights had occurred, but 
denied relief on harmless error grounds, or where a state court errone-
ously determined that there was no constitutional violation of the defen-
dant’s rights, and under waiver, procedural default or deferential habeas 
corpus review, appellate and federal courts refused to vacate the convic-
tion.177 
4. Governmental Liability 
a. State Government 
The Eleventh Amendment insulates states and state agencies from 
suit for damages or equitable relief.178  The complexity, incoherency, and 
manipulability of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has been the sub-
ject of extensive commentary and debate,179 and for the most part is be-
yond the scope of this article.  What is relevant is the effect of this sover-
eign immunity doctrine on the availability of remedies for constitutional 
violations by state officers and the consequential impact on the enforce-
ment of constitutional norms. 
The potentially broad disabling effects of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity have been substantially minimized by the doctrine of Ex parte 
Young, which permits suit against state officials for unconstitutional con-
duct.180  However, it is not the case that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment al-
 
 176. See Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing whether a Fourth 
Amendment claim is barred by Heck); Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 798–99 (5th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that where plaintiff had been convicted of aggravated assault under Texas law, the “force used by 
the deputies . . . up to and including deadly force, cannot be deemed excessive.”); Covington v. City of 
New York, 171 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[I]n a case where the only evidence for conviction was 
obtained pursuant to an arrest, recovery in a civil case based on false arrest would necessarily impugn 
any conviction resulting from the use of the evidence.”); Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 556 
(7th Cir. 1997) (success on either unlawful arrest or excessive force claim would not have necessarily 
implied the invalidity of a potential conviction on murder charge); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 
85 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[A] charge that probable cause for a warrantless arrest was lacking, 
and thus that the seizure was unconstitutional, would not necessarily implicate the validity of a subse-
quently obtained conviction—at least in the usual case.”). 
 177. Exhaustion of remedies is also required in prisoner litigation.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) 
(2003). 
 178. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States and per-
mits suits for damages for certain acts or omissions by government employees, but limits liability to 
negligent, nondiscretionary conduct and to the intentional torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution when these are committed by federal investi-
gative or law enforcement officers.  Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1994).  Thus, a wide 
range of constitutional violations including first amendment, due process, and equal protection claims 
cannot be remedied under the Act.  The tort which forms the basis of the suit must be recognized by 
the law of the state in which it occurred; accordingly, a constitutional violation must constitute a sepa-
rate tort under state law to be actionable.  Washington v. DEA, 183 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 1999); 
Rhoden v. United States, 55 F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1995).  The Act provides no right to a jury trial and 
prohibits an award of punitive damages. 
 179. Amar, supra note 10, at 1479; Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 10, at 49. 
 180. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
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most never matters.”181  First, Ex parte Young does not apply to permit 
retroactive payments from the state treasury.182  Thus, systematic viola-
tions of the rights of a class of persons pursuant to state law that would 
otherwise be remedied by payments directed by the state are retrospec-
tively immune.183  Second, while states may indemnify the individual offi-
cial, indemnification by the state is not a universal practice.184  Indeed, in 
cases in which the official’s conduct was particularly egregious, the state 
will often refuse indemnification, thus creating the anomalous situation 
of denying compensation in the most serious cases. 
Third, there are cases in which the officials are not identifiable or 
where their conduct was the product of state law or policies.  In the first 
situation, the indemnification question becomes moot and there is no le-
gal recourse.  In the second, the official is likely to be protected by quali-
fied immunity and the state will be protected by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.185  Thus, the Eleventh Amendment plays a role in the right-remedy 
gap.186  Congress has power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to override Eleventh Amendment immunity.187  However, the 
Court has placed substantial limits on Congressional powers under sec-
tion 5, ruling that where Congress goes beyond the prohibition of consti-
tutionally forbidden conduct (e.g., intentional discrimination), it must 
demonstrate both that the legislation is necessary to provide prophylactic 
measures to carry out the objectives of the constitutional guarantee and 
that the law is a limited response to a pattern of unlawful conduct.188 
The Court’s restrictive standard was initially applied in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, where it held unconstitutional the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, a statute providing broader free exercise rights than 
recognized by Supreme Court precedent, on the ground that section 5 
does not authorize Congress to “enforce a constitutional right by chang-
ing what the right is.”189  According to the Court, Congress could only 
remedy or prevent constitutional violations by legislation that was “con-
gruent” and “proportional” to the “injury to be prevented or reme-
 
 181. Jeffries, Eleventh Amendment, supra note 10, at 49. 
 182. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (bringing challenge to administration of federal-
state programs of Aid to Aged, Blind and Disabled). 
 183. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). 
 184. This observation is based on my own litigation and consultation with other civil rights law-
yers. 
 185. See Brown, supra note 80, at 1533–34. 
 186. It should also be noted that states may not be sued in state court under § 1983, as the Court 
has ruled that “states” are not “persons” as that term is defined in the statute, Will v. Mich. Dep’t. of 
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989), and that the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from 
awarding injunctive relief against a state official on the basis of state law.  Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984). 
 187. See Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 
(1999). 
 188. See Brown, supra note 80, at 2165. 
 189. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
RUDOVSKY.DOC 10/13/2005  2:30:49 PM 
1230 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2005 
died.”190  In quick succession, the Court applied this standard to strike 
down federal laws authorizing suits against states for patent infringe-
ment,191 age discrimination in employment,192 gender-motivated vio-
lence,193 and discrimination against disabled persons.194 
Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett was a particu-
larly telling rejection of Congressional power to enforce civil rights laws 
against the states.  Patricia Garrett, a Director of Nursing at a state hos-
pital, suffered from breast cancer and as a result was given a lower pay-
ing job.195  The Court assumed that the conduct violated the ADA, but it 
ruled that Congress lacked the power to authorize such suits against the 
state.196  Disparate treatment of the disabled was subject to a “rational 
basis” test, and even though Congress had built a record demonstrating 
that many state laws were inadequate in dealing with discrimination 
against the disabled, the Court found insufficient evidence of “unconsti-
tutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled.”197  
While the Court did not go so far as to condemn any legislation that went 
beyond what the Court might find unconstitutional, it severely restricted 
Congressional power to prevent or remedy this type of discriminatory 
conduct by measures that prohibited more than the core constitutional 
misconduct.198 
The balance the Court has drawn between respect for states and 
protection of constitutional rights is revealing.  In Alden v. Maine, re-
sponding to an argument that suits against states are essential for the su-
premacy of federal law, Justice Kennedy stated:  “We are unwilling to as-
sume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding 
laws of the United States.  The good faith of the States thus provides an 
 
 190. Id. at 520. 
 191. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 672–73 (state remedies for violations may have been insufficient 
in some cases, but legislation was not an “appropriate” response). 
 192. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82–83 (2000) (age discrimination is subject to ra-
tional basis standard and ADEA lacks congruence and proportionality because it would prohibit con-
duct that was not in itself unconstitutional). 
 193. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that remedies of Violence 
Against Women Act cannot be applied against states, notwithstanding extensive fact findings of state 
failure to provide effective remedies for gender related violence as not every state failed to provide 
remedies; Act also lacked congruence and proportionality). 
 194. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001). 
 195. Id. at 363. 
 196. Id. at 374. 
 197. Id. at 368 (emphasis added).  Justice Breyer, in dissent, argued that the Court had unfairly 
picked apart “a vast legislative record documenting” discrimination.  Id. at 377. 
 198. For critical commentary on the section 5 cases, see generally Susan Bandes, Fear and Degra-
dation in Alabama: The Emotional Subtext of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
520 (2003); Karlan, supra note 10; Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s 
Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367 (2002); Robert C. Post & Reva B. 
Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 
110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). 
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important assurance that [the Constitution and laws will be supreme].”199  
As Professor Chemerinsky has written: 
Is it possible to imagine that 30 or 40 years ago, at the height of the 
civil rights movement, the Supreme Court would have issued such a 
statement that state governments simply could be trusted to volun-
tarily comply with federal law?  James Madison said that if people 
were angels there would be no need for a Constitution, but there 
would be no need for a government, either.  The reality is that state 
governments, intentionally or unintentionally, at times will violate 
federal law.  To rely on trust in the good faith of state governments 
is no assurance of compliance with federal law at all.200 
Recent cases may mark the limits of the Court’s resistance to Con-
gressional power,201 but it is apparent that the current standards for as-
sessing federal legislative authority to override the Eleventh Amendment 
will continue to limit Congressional response to state sovereign immu-
nity. 
b. Municipal Liability 
Local governmental units do not qualify for Eleventh Amendment 
immunity,202 but the Court has erected culpability and causation re-
quirements that make it quite difficult to establish local government li-
ability.  The jurisprudence of municipal liability reflects a deep divide be-
tween legal theory and institutional reality.  The Court has failed to 
appreciate the significance of the organizational culture and hierarchical 
structure of law enforcement agencies and, consequently, has bypassed 
remedies for practices and policies that cause many constitutional viola-
tions.203 
Studies and investigations of law enforcement practices and organ-
izational structures by government agencies, independent auditors, and 
litigants in court proceedings have documented the “us vs. them” atti-
 
 199. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999); see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (“It is a most serious charge to say a State has engaged in a pattern or practice designed to 
deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws .  .  .”).  It should be noted that the Court has not been 
hesitant to employ federal preemption doctrine to override state laws that provide more protection to 
state residents than federal law.  See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001). 
 200. Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 537, 541 (2003) (footnote omitted). 
 201. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1986, 1994 (2004) (holding that Congress authorized 
to enact Title II of ADA to make state liable for failure to make courthouse accessible to people with 
disabilities; Congress may “enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory 
in effect, if not in intent”); Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 439 (2004) (holding that Eleventh Amend-
ment does not bar federal court enforcement of consent decree); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 
538 U.S. 721, 728, 734 (2003) (upholding Family Medical Leave Act against the states as a proper ex-
ercise of Congressional power to enforce “the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the 
workplace”). 
 202. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978). 
 203. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 453, 525–45 (2004). 
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tudes of law enforcement officers, the pervasiveness of the code of si-
lence in many departments, the unwritten policies and practices of using 
extra-legal measures to increase crime control and order maintenance, 
and the lack of management controls and accountability for abusive con-
duct.204  Yet, officials continue to explain serious misconduct in terms of 
“bad apples” or “rogue cops” and ignore the direct relationship between 
organizational culture and patterns of misconduct.205 
Governmental commission reports and scholarly studies have made 
clear that systemic misconduct is often the result of police training, su-
pervision, and disciplinary practices and policies.206  Consistently, these 
Commission reports and more recent consent decrees and settlement 
agreements have focused on the need for comprehensive computerized 
data necessary for internal management and external monitoring of 
abuse and corruption, supervision and audits of narcotics squads on is-
sues of search warrants and informants, full reporting on use of force, 
pedestrian and vehicular stops (including data on racial patterns of these 
stops), independence and integrity of internal affairs investigation, and 
in-service training on use of force and integrity issues.207  As Professor 
Armacost has commented: 
[A] law enforcement organization that tolerates repeated, notorious 
instances of the worst kinds of brutality—even by a minority of po-
lice officers—effectively signals to its employees that a certain level 
of violence is acceptable despite formal policies to the con-
trary. . . . Moreover, empirical research suggests that departments 
with high levels of excessive or unlawful uses of force also tend to 
have high incidence of all uses of force by its officers.  This correla-
tion strongly suggests that the so-called rogue cops are only a small 
part of a broader, more systemic phenomenon.208 
 
 204. See, e.g., Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption (1994) (Mollen Com-
mission Report); L.A. County Sheriff’s Dep’t., A Report by Special Counsel James G. Kolt (1992) 
(Kolt Report); Report of the Boston Police Dep’t. Management Review Committee (1992) (St. Clair 
Commission Report); REPORT OF THE INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T (1991) (Christo-
pher Commission); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1998); JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, 
ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 193–216 (1993); JAMES Q. WILSON, 
VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 
(1968); Bandes, supra note 166; David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 480–88 (1992). 
 205. See Armacost, supra note 203, at 457–59, 521–22. 
 206. See sources cited supra note 204; see also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1822. 
 207. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 204.  It is not surprising that the abuse of prisoners by the 
U.S. military in Iraq and other locations has resulted from the same management deficiencies and or-
ganizational culture.  See Report of James R. Schlesinger (August, 2004); Report of Lt. General Paul 
T. Mikolashek (July, 2004); Report of Maj. General George R. Fay and Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones 
(August, 2004); see also Dahlia Lithwick, No Smoking Gun, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, at A27. 
 208. Armacost, supra note 203, at 506 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).  On the issue of 
the “code of silence,” see Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 467 n.6 (1985) (code of silence is “induced by 
peer pressure”); Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49, 62–64 (2d Cir. 2000); Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 
1074, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomas v. City of New Orleans, 687 F.2d 80, 82–83 (5th Cir. 1982); 
SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 204, at 13; Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” 
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In this context, the legal standards for assessing municipal liability 
are of critical importance.  If police and other law enforcement agencies 
cannot be held accountable for practices and procedures that cause con-
stitutional violations, the remedial gap will be very difficult to fill with 
alternative remedies.  Moreover, if this lack of accountability results 
from a lack of judicial understanding of the significance of the practices 
and policies of these agencies, the disconnect between fundamental 
causative factors and constitutional injury will remain. 
In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Court construed sec-
tion 1983 to permit actions against municipalities where a policy of the 
governmental entity caused the constitutional violation.209  Initially, the 
Court expected that the threat of damages would encourage policy mak-
ers “to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize the 
likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights.”210  
Over the years, however, it has insisted that liability be imposed only 
upon a high level of proof of culpability.  Thus, a plaintiff can prove mu-
nicipal liability by showing that the governmental unit did not properly 
train, supervise, or discipline police officers, but only where 
in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the 
need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inade-
quacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that 
the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been de-
liberately indifferent to the need.211 
Moreover, the Court has ruled that a plaintiff seeking to prove li-
ability where the municipality has not “directly inflicted an in-
jury . . . rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be ap-
plied. . . . ”212  The Court has also determined that municipal liability can 
be based on the actions of policymakers whose “edicts or acts may fairly 
be said to represent official policy,”213 but few policymakers fall within 
this narrow definition.214  Under this standard, municipalities may defend 
suits on the basis of general, formal policies consistent with the Constitu-
tion even where officials in fact are exercising their discretion in a man-
ner that violates constitutional rights, and relatively few cases have found 
final actions by policymakers violative.215 
 
as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 
250–56 (1998). 
 209. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 
 210. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980). 
 211. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). 
 212. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (rejecting claim based on negli-
gent hiring theory).  The lower courts have rejected claims absent strong proof of municipal derelic-
tion.  See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd., 238 F.3d 518, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2000); Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 
F.3d 1299, 1308 (10th Cir. 1998) (requiring plaintiff to show that officer was “highly likely to inflict the 
particular injury suffered”). 
 213. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 
 214. St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124–27 (1988). 
 215. See Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1172–73 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Although 
Roberts was provided with the discretion to order searches within the school, she had no authority to 
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Even where a final policymaker is responsible for the constitutional 
violation, Eleventh Amendment immunity will preclude recovery of 
damages against the governmental unit if it is determined that the poli-
cymaker was acting as a state official.216  The issue of whether an official 
acts for the state can be quite complex as officials may act in different 
capacities depending upon the functions involved.  For example, chief 
prosecutors and sheriffs are generally elected or appointed on a county 
level, are often paid by county funds, but perform both local and state 
functions in their law enforcement responsibilities.217  Moreover, some 
courts have absolved local officials of liability where they act pursuant to 
state statutes.218 
The Court’s insistence on proof of a high level of culpability by in-
dividual officers could be viewed as a proper means of protecting them 
from damages awards where they acted reasonably, but in light of the 
Court’s rulings that governmental entities must also be shown to have 
acted with heightened culpability before they can be held liable in dam-
ages, it is apparent that immunity doctrines for individual defendants are 
less about protecting them from damages than they are about reducing 
remedies and narrowing constitutional protections.219  I do not mean to 
suggest that municipal liability claims are so difficult to prove as to ren-
der this remedy entirely ineffective as a means of compensation or deter-
rence.  Even under the Court’s restrictive standards, governmental enti-
 
alter the District’s explicit policy that searches could not be conducted absent reasonable suspi-
cion . . . . [I]t is irrelevant that Roberts’s decision was not subject to review because it was contrary to 
the District’s official written policy.”), opinion reinstated and supplemented, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 
2003); Greensboro Prof’l Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 965–66 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that fire chief’s power to “appoint and to establish procedures for making appointments was 
always subject to the parameters established by the City”); Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (to hold municipality liable, agent’s action must “implement rather than frustrate the gov-
ernment’s policy”).  But see Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 586 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In this case, the Sher-
iff’s actions were those of the County because his relationship with [plaintiff] grew out of the at-
tempted murder investigation and because . . . he used his authority over the investigation to coerce 
sex with her.”). 
 216. See Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that Georgia 
sheriff, in his official capacity, was an arm of the state, not county, in establishing use-of-force police at 
jail and in training and disciplining deputies in that regard). 
 217. See, e.g., McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 793 (1997) (ruling that Alabama Sheriff 
is a state law enforcement officer even though he is elected and paid by county); Manders, 338 F.3d at 
1328.  But see Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council—President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 281–83 (5th Cir. 
2002) (stating that sheriff in Louisiana is not an “arm of the state” and not entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity); Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that California district attorney is state officer when deciding whether to prosecute an individual, but 
county officer for some purposes). 
 218. See, e.g., Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Servs., Inc. v. Leean, 154 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 
1998) (addressing local enforcement of unconstitutional medicaid laws). 
 219. Deterrence policies are also compromised by the rule that municipalities are immune from 
punitive damages awards under § 1983.  City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 
(1981).  In his concurring opinion in Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2000), Judge 
Calabresi addressed violations of § 1983 where not all persons injured by an unconstitutional policy 
are able or willing to bring suit.  In such circumstances, the municipality is not forced to bear the entire 
cost of its unconstitutional policy, and may not be sufficiently motivated to change its practices without 
a kind of “socially compensatory damages.”  Id. at 245 (concurring opinion). 
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ties have been subjected to damages and injunctive relief upon the requi-
site showing of deliberate indifference or policymaker causation.220  In-
deed, the Monell—City of Canton v. Harris standards have provided 
grounds for some institutional reform litigation.221  Overall, the municipal 
liability jurisprudence reflects the partially open courthouse doors that 
characterize much of the civil rights litigation remedial framework. 
B. Equitable Relief 
Injunctive and declaratory relief are powerful tools in preventing fu-
ture misconduct and in securing governmental compliance with constitu-
tional norms.  Indeed, in some cases, equitable relief may be the most 
appropriate approach to balancing the remedial factors.  During the 
1960s and 1970s, the “structural injunction” became a vital part of reform 
litigation that challenged conditions in a number of governmental institu-
tions, including schools, prisons, mental hospitals, and police depart-
ments.222  Over the past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has limited 
the scope and reach of these injunctions, and in specific areas, Congress 
too, has limited federal judicial injunctive powers.223  The judicial limita-
tions are based on federalism, comity, and separation of powers princi-
ples, and the resulting framework has placed significant restraints on eq-
uitable remedies in civil rights cases.  Thus, while the Court has not 
 
 220. See, e.g., Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1290 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding sufficient evidence 
from which jury could conclude that Denver policymakers were deliberately indifferent in failing to 
train officers in off-shift implementation of always armed/always on duty policy); Allen v. Muskogee, 
119 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1997) (the need for different training as to how to approach armed, suici-
dal, mentally disturbed persons was so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in violation of 
constitutional rights that the policymakers of the City could reasonably be said to have been deliber-
ately indifferent to the need,”); Zuchel v. City of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 740–41 (10th Cir. 1993) (jury 
could find failure to implement recommended periodic live “shoot–don’t shoot” range training consti-
tuted deliberate indifference); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1992) (address-
ing failure to train assistant district attorneys on their obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963)); Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 1992) (failure to train officer adequately 
with result that he allowed his baton to be taken from him and then killed an unarmed civilian, pur-
portedly to save his own life); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991) (ruling that 
failure to train officers in the legal limits of use of force constituted “deliberate indifference” to safety 
of inhabitants as a matter of law). 
 221. See Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001) (strip search policy in jail); Easyriders v. 
Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 1996); Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994); 
Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1992); Int’l Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Lo-
cal Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1986); Md. State Conference of NAACP Branches 
v. Md. State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 1999). 
 222. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE: HOW COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (Alfred Blumstein & David Farring-
ton eds., 1998); OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); Chayes, Foreword, Public Law 
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Chayes, supra note 10 (discussing the role 
of courts in issuing mandatory injunctions); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary 
and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).  For a recent discussion 
of these issues, see Karlan, supra note 10. 
 223. See discussion infra at Part IV.C. 
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heeded calls to eliminate the structural injunction,224 it has imposed pro-
cedural hurdles that substantially erode the availability of the equitable 
remedy. 
To secure injunctive or declaratory relief, a civil rights plaintiff must 
satisfy a number of justiciability requirements, including standing, ripe-
ness, and case or controversy.225  Standing doctrine is comprised of both 
constitutional and prudential limitations on the exercise of federal court 
jurisdiction.  For many years, standing to seek equitable remedies rested 
on the plaintiff’s “personal stake” in the controversy.226  However, in City 
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the Court imposed a stricter test, demanding a 
strong likelihood of recurrence of unconstitutional conduct.227  Lyons was 
stopped by Los Angeles police officers for a traffic violation; the officers 
drew their guns, ordered Lyons to place his hands behind his head and, 
without provocation, placed him in a chokehold.228  He lost consciousness 
and suffered damage to his larynx.229 
Notwithstanding evidence that the chokehold had led to the death 
of sixteen suspects in Los Angeles (twelve of whom were minorities),230 
the Supreme Court ruled that Lyons had not proved a sufficient likeli-
hood that he would again be subject to a police chokehold to make out a 
case or controversy on his request for an injunction.231  The Court stated: 
In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons would 
have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter 
with the police but also make the incredible assertion either (1) that 
all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with 
whom they happen to have an encounter, whether for the purpose 
 
 224. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 123, 131 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A structural 
reform decree eviscerates a State’s discretionary authority over its own programs and budgets . . . .”).  
Some commentators have also been critical of the reform injunctive process.  See ROSENBERG, supra 
note 31; Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Pub-
lic Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979) (questioning federal courts intervention into state and local 
governmental matters); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1738–44 
(1996); John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of 
the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121 (1996). 
 225. Standing requires that the plaintiff state an actual case or controversy in which he has a “per-
sonal stake.”  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 213–14 (2000); 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).  Ripeness requires that the case is applied to the plaintiff.  
See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997).  Mootness occurs when the case or 
controversy is not alive and active when the lawsuit is brought.  See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. 
at 212–13; Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997). 
 226. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 828–29 
(1974). 
 227. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983). 
 228. Id. at 97–98. 
 229. Id. at 98. 
 230. Id. at 115–16 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 231. Id. at 112. 
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of arrest, issuing a citation or questioning, or (2) that the City or-
dered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.232 
The adverse impact on civil rights injunctions of the additional ele-
ment of the standing calculus—the likelihood of future harm—has been 
substantial, but not fatal.  The plaintiff can show a “credible” or “realis-
tic” threat of future harm by proof that the harm was the product of a 
policy or practice of a governmental unit,233 that the harm was visited 
upon individuals engaged in protected activity,234 or proof of conduct vio-
lative of environmental protection or anti-discrimination laws.235 
In some cases, the Supreme Court has appeared to broaden stand-
ing, a development that raises the question (that pervades the Court’s 
overall approach to civil rights and criminal procedural remedies) of 
whether the federalism, separation of powers, and judicial restraint ra-
tionales are invoked to protect against judicial overreaching or whether 
the restrictions on remedies are intended as “bulwarks against liberal ac-
tivism.”236  Consider, for example, the Court’s recent affirmative action 
ruling in Gratz v. Bollinger,237 a challenge brought by white applicants to 
the University of Michigan who had enrolled at other schools at the time 
they filed their complaint.  Neither of the plaintiffs had applied again to 
the University and they alleged only that they intended to seek admis-
 
 232. Id. at 105–06; see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 
379–80 (1976); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974); Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 
1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
 233. See, e.g., Ex rel. Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 345 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding standing be-
cause “[i]n contrast [to Lyons], the challenged interrogation methods in this case are officially en-
dorsed policies”); Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir. 1994) (plaintiffs alleged a 
“policy, practice and custom” of harassing homeless persons); Am. Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 
968 F.2d 1373, 1377 (1st Cir. 1992) (“In none of the Supreme Court cases addressing the question of 
standing to obtain equitable relief was the challenged practice a routine, daily procedure implemented 
as a matter of policy by the defendants.”); Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 508–09 
(9th Cir. 1992) (finding standing where plaintiff alleged that “misconduct was condoned and tacitly 
authorized by department policy makers” and that repeated violations had occurred). 
 234. See Church, 30 F.3d at 1339 (granting homeless plaintiffs standing, since due to the “allegedly 
involuntary nature of their condition, the plaintiffs cannot avoid future ‘exposure to the challenged 
course of conduct’ in which the City allegedly engages”; Thomas, 978 F.2d at 508 (“[M]any victims 
purportedly did nothing to warrant detention or apprehension prior to the mistreatment.”); Hernan-
dez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230, 234–35 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The injury . . . did not result from an individual’s 
disobedience of official instructions and [the plaintiff] was not engaged in any form of misconduct”); 
Nat’l Cong. for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(“The fact that plaintiffs were stopped while engaging in everyday tasks further illustrates a realistic 
risk of future harm.”). 
 235. In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), the Court 
granted standing to plaintiffs in an environmental lawsuit challenging the pollution of a river.  The 
Court ruled that there was “nothing ‘improbable’ about the proposition that a company’s continuous 
and pervasive discharge of pollutants into a river would cause nearby residents to curtail their recrea-
tional use of that waterway and would subject them to other economic and aesthetic harms.”  Id. at 
184 (citation omitted); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322 (1988); Thomas, 978 F.2d at 508 (prac-
tices aimed at minorities). 
 236. See Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Mov-
ing!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 146 (2003). 
 237. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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sion if successful in the lawsuit.238  Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the 
standing requirement was satisfied on the allegation of an “intent to ap-
ply again,”239 an assertion that had been rejected in previous cases as too 
“conjectural or hypothetical.”240  Under this test, plaintiffs who simply al-
lege that they intend to engage in activities that will subject them to 
unlawful practices would have standing.  That may be the proper stan-
dard, but it is a sharp departure from the Court’s previous cases,241 and 
the Court’s willingness to intervene on the merits may well have turned 
on the political dimension of the substantive rights at stake.242 
The Court has also limited private enforcement of congressional 
legislation.  Early cases had endorsed a liberal application of the private 
cause of action to enforce legislation by not demanding express congres-
sional authorization.243  In Cannon v. University of Chicago,244 the Court 
had approved of lower court decisions holding that section 601 of Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, barring intentional discrimination by 
race or national origin by federally funded programs or activities, could 
be enforced by private plaintiffs.  In Alexander v. Sandoval, however, the 
Court ruled that regulations adopted by a number of federal agencies 
 
 238. Id. at 260–64. 
 239. Id. at 261. 
 240. Id. at 285 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)); see 
also Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (rejecting standing 
on claim of highway racial profiling even though the plaintiff asserted an intent to use that highway in 
the future). 
 241. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 285; see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (granting standing in 
racial gerrymandering case because classifications “threaten to stigmatize”).  Commentators have as-
serted that traditional standing requirements were simply ignored in the voting cases.  See John Hart 
Ely, Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 576, 581 (1997); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2276, 2285–86, 2286 n.48 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Vot-
ing Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 278 (describing the Court’s “complete disregard for stand-
ing requirements” in voting rights cases). 
 242. Some doctrines appear to be driven not by concern for state and local government opera-
tions or by separation of powers concerns, but rather by the “liberal” or “conservative” results that 
will flow from the decisions.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the 
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 474 (2002) (“[The Court’s] considera-
tions of federalism are outweighed by interests in advancing a substantively conservative constitutional 
agenda.”).  For example, the Court has rejected habeas claims where the state court issued an ambigu-
ous ruling as to whether it ruled on federal grounds, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806 
(1991), but was willing to hear state appeals from similarly ambiguous state court judgments under a 
presumption that the state court relied on federal grounds.  Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 
(1983); see Amar, supra note 10, at 1473 n.201 (labeling as “doublespeak” the Court’s exacting stan-
dards regarding waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunities and its permissive standards with respect 
to waiver of personal constitutional rights in the criminal procedural context); Chemerinsky, supra 
note 200, at 553 (“Rehnquist Court’s use of federalism has been entirely about limiting Congress’ 
powers, not about empowering state and local governments generally.”); D. Karlan, supra note 10, at 
186; Kramer, supra note 39, at 122 n.515; Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judici-
ary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 229 (2003); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103–
04 (2000). 
 243. See J.I. Case, Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (“[U]nder the circumstances it is the 
duty of the courts . . . to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional 
purpose.”). 
 244. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
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under section 602 of Title VI (authorizing federal agencies to “effectu-
ate” the provisions of section 601) which prohibited both intentional dis-
crimination and conduct that had a discriminatory impact, could not be 
enforced by a private cause of action.245 
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Court went further and ruled that 
rights created by Congress pursuant to its spending powers in the Family 
Education Rights and Privacy Act were not enforceable by a private 
cause of action or directly under § 1983, absent unambiguous congres-
sional authorization.246  Inherent in this approach to enforcement of con-
gressional legislation is a built-in gap between rights and remedies.  The 
Court has followed a similar approach in narrowing the implied constitu-
tional cause of action, first recognized in Bivens.  In a series of cases, the 
Court has denied a private cause of action for constitutional violations by 
federal officials on the grounds that “special factors” counsel against 
such claims in the absence of Congressional grants of jurisdiction or be-
cause Congress has provided some other remedies for the violations.247  
Whatever the merits of the Court’s current standards for congressional 
authorization of private causes of action, the result is to preclude private 
enforcement and to leave responsibility for enforcement in the hands of 
the federal government.  Under this regime, even where the administra-
tion is sympathetic to the goals of the statutes, scarcity of enforcement 
resources will lead to underenforcement; where there is hostility to the 
statutes, enforcement can be almost nonexistent.248 
Federalism principles have also been invoked to close federal 
courthouse doors to civil rights plaintiffs, pending state or administrative 
proceedings.  In Younger v. Harris, the Court ruled that federal courts 
should abstain from hearing claims of unconstitutional state criminal 
prosecutions,249 and has since extended the abstention doctrine to state-
initiated civil enforcement proceedings,250 state administrative proceed-
ings,251 and to suits between private parties where substantial state inter-
ests are involved.252 
 
 245. 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). 
 246. 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2003). 
 247. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 678 (1987) (holding even in case of gross vio-
lations, to bar claims against government based on misconduct of military officials under FTCA be-
cause of evidence of Congressional intent); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (finding no 
claim for racial discrimination in the Navy); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) (no Bivens claim 
for whistle-blower in light of alternative employment remedies).  See also Correctional Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2002), where the Court refused an implied cause of action by a federal pris-
oner against a private prison provider for failure to render necessary medical care. 
 248. See Three Rivers Ctr. For Indep. Living, Inc. v. Housing Auth. Pitts., 382 F.3d 412, 417 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (noting HUD’s failure to enforce ADA provisions); Enforcement of Civil Rights Law De-
clined Since ‘99, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at A17; Karlan, supra note 10, at 195. 
 249. 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971). 
 250. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975). 
 251. E.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433 (1982) 
(stating that state bar disciplinary proceedings not subject to federal intervention). 
 252. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14 n.12 (1987). 
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The Court has more recently emphasized that federal statutory ju-
risdiction should be presumed mandatory and that the abstention doc-
trine does not preclude suits for equitable relief even in the face of a 
state initiated declaratory judgment action,253 but the abstention doctrine 
continues to limit access to the federal courts. 
Finally, the Court has compromised civil rights injunctive litigation 
by its decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health & Human Resources.254  The Civil Rights Attor-
ney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976255 has been an indispensable tool in pro-
viding civil rights plaintiffs access to the federal courts.  The Act encour-
ages lawyers to litigate valid complaints, particularly with respect to 
injunctive actions.256  Some civil rights organizations have succeeded in 
raising funds to support this type of litigation, but without the engage-
ment of private lawyers, the pool of cases would shrink considerably. 
The Act had been construed by the lower federal courts to author-
ize payment of fees to plaintiffs where the legal action was the “catalyst” 
for a “voluntary” change in practice or policy by the defendant.257  How-
ever, in Buckhannon, the Court ruled that plaintiffs are not entitled to 
fees on a “catalyst theory” of recovery, and held that the term “prevail-
ing party” requires a judgment, court-approved settlement, or some 
other court order that formally changes the legal relationship between 
the parties.258  This ruling permits defendants to litigate equitable claims 
to the point of judgment, and then avoid fees by consenting to the relief 
requested.  The Court’s hostility to legislation that was intended to 
broaden access to the courts in civil rights cases is reflected in Justice 
Scalia’s comments regarding the comparative interests at stake: 
It could be argued, perhaps, that insofar as abstract justice is con-
cerned, there is little to choose between the dissent’s outcome and 
the Court’s:  If the former sometimes rewards the plaintiff with a 
phony claim (there is no way of knowing), the latter sometimes de-
nies fees to the plaintiff with a solid case whose adversary slinks 
away on the eve of judgment.  But it seems to me the evil of the 
former far outweighs the evil of the latter.  There is all the differ-
ence in the world between a rule that denies the extraordinary boon 
 
 253. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989). 
 254. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
 255. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000). 
 256. See Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 200 (1998). 
 257. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 258. Id. at 610; see also Richard S. v. Dep’t of Developmental Servs. of Cal., 317 F.3d 1080, 1089 
(9th Cir. 2003) (settlement agreement record reflected that parties intended the agreement to be en-
forceable, even without a consent decree or court judgment); Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 
159, 165–66 (3d Cir. 2002) (settlement agreement, approved by court and titled “Order,” that gave 
plaintiff right to judicial enforcement was sufficient to support award of fees); Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. 
Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 273, 281–85 (4th Cir. 2002) (preliminary injunction and later administrative 
change of challenged policy that led to dismissal on mootness grounds not sufficient to support claim 
for fees; court suggests that incorporation of terms of agreement into dismissal order or judicial reten-
tion of jurisdiction to enforce settlement would be a basis for fee application). 
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of attorney’s fees to some plaintiffs who are no less “deserving” of 
them than others who receive them, and a rule that causes the law 
to be the very instrument of wrong—exacting the payment of attor-
ney’s fees to the extortionist.259 
There has been one significant counter-development with respect to 
equitable intervention.  In 1994, in response to the Rodney King inci-
dent, Congress authorized the United States, through the Attorney Gen-
eral, to bring civil actions for declaratory or equitable relief against po-
lice departments engaged in a pattern or practice of deprivation of 
constitutional or statutory rights.260  The statute provides potentially 
broad grounds for intervention and relief, but political realities have 
muted the law’s potential reach.261 
The Department of Justice and private litigators have crafted con-
sent decrees and other settlement agreements that mandate systemic in-
stitutional reforms.262  Police departments are required to collect and 
maintain in electronic form a wide range of information that is critical to 
the effective internal management of departments and to external moni-
toring of abuse and corruption issues.  Decrees prohibit racial profiling 
and require the race of the suspect and the reasons for the police action 
to be recorded for all stops, searches, and arrests.263  Further, police de-
partments are required to computerize their record-keeping operations 
in a manner that creates accessible fields of relevant information and to 
initiate early warning systems to alert commanders and outside monitors 
of troublesome trends or performances.264 
C. Congressional Door Closing Measures: The Prison Litigation 
Reform Act 
While the Court has viewed with a jaundiced eye federal legislation 
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that is intended to 
broaden the scope of civil rights remedies, it has had few reservations 
with respect to legislation that closes the courthouse doors to highly dis-
 
 259. 532 U.S. at 618 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).  Justice Scalia does not explain how 
the availability of catalyst fees make governmental defendants with meritorious defenses vulnerable to 
contrived demands, nor does he provide any examples of such cases.  Moreover, because Congress 
intended to encourage civil rights litigation through the award of fees, a judicial rebalancing of the 
“evils” of fee shifting is highly questionable. 
 260. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000).  For a discussion of the implementation of the Act by the Depart-
ment of Justice, see Armacost, supra note 203, at 525–31; Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural 
Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1384, 1404–24 (2000); Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on 
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815 (1999). 
 261. Livingston, supra note 260, at 841–50. 
 262. Consent Decree at 3–13, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, C.A. No. 97-354 (W.D. Pa. 
1997) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/Split/dowments/pitts.htm; Consent Decree at 9–30, United 
States v. State of New Jersey, C.A. No. 99-5970 (D.N.J. 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
split/documents/jerseysa.htm. 
 263. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 6–29, State of New Jersey (No. 99-5970). 
 264. See Consent Decree at 8, City of Pittsburgh, (No. 97-354). 
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favored groups.  Over the years, there have been congressional attempts 
to limit the jurisdiction and remedial powers of the federal courts with 
respect to cases involving school busing, abortion, and school prayer.265  
The question of whether Congress can selectively limit jurisdiction and 
remedial powers of the federal courts has been the subject of sharp de-
bate,266 but it has remained largely academic since Congress had failed to 
enact such legislation. 
In the 1990s, Congress approached the issue from a slightly different 
perspective, but with far reaching consequences.  Targeting groups with-
out political power or support, Congress imposed wide-ranging limita-
tions on access to the courts by prisoners seeking to litigate conditions of 
confinement cases,267 inmates seeking to challenge convictions by means 
of federal habeas corpus,268 and immigrants seeking to challenge govern-
ment efforts at deportation and incarceration.269  And, as part of an effort 
to deprive plaintiffs with disfavored claims, Congress also sought to limit 
the types of cases litigated and judicial relief requested by legal services 
lawyers.270  There is a sad irony in the fact that Congress (and the courts 
which have sustained and implemented these restrictive conditions) have 
selectively limited rights for these “discrete and insular minorities.”271 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) limits the injunctive 
powers of federal courts in prisoner rights litigation;272 requires prisoners, 
as opposed to all other civil rights plaintiffs, to exhaust administrative 
remedies;273 reduces attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs;274 creates a 
“three strike” provision disallowing in forma pauperis filings where 
courts have earlier dismissed actions by that inmate;275 and precludes 
 
 265. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate Over Congress’ Power to Restrict the 
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 1311, 1319–20 nn.40–42 (1984) (citing nu-
merous proposed federal laws aimed at restricting federal judicial review over cases involving school 
busing, abortion, and school prayer). 
 266. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Ju-
risdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Hart, supra note 85; Symposium, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998). 
 267. Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2004); 28 U.S.C.§ 1915 (2005); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3626 (2004). 
 268. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996). 
 269. See id.; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).  For commentary on this door closing legislation, see Symposium, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2445 (1988); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Patholo-
gies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 
DUKE L. J. 1 (1997). 
 270. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548–49 (2001) (holding unconstitutional 
statute that prevented federally funded legal services lawyers from challenging welfare laws). 
 271. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 272. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b); see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000) (ruling automatic stay provi-
sion of PLRA suspending prison conditions injunctions does not violate separation of powers princi-
ples). 
 273. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).  The exhaustion requirement has been interpreted as 
well to incorporate a procedural default provision which precludes any civil action for failure to timely 
exhaust prison grievance procedures.  See, e.g., Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 274. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(d) (2003). 
 275. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994). 
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compensatory damage awards for “mental or emotional injury” from 
proven constitutional violations where the inmate has not suffered 
“physical injury.”276 
The physical injury requirement provides a revealing example of the 
Act’s limitations on recovery even for proven constitutional violations.  
In Hudson v. McMillian, the Court ruled that excessive force claims 
could be established without proof of serious bodily injury, noting that 
certain malicious conduct (for example, threatening to kill or torture an 
inmate) would otherwise not be actionable.277  Of course, aside from 
claims of denial of medical care or excessive force, physical injury will be 
rare.  Constitutional violations caused by censorship, punishment for 
protected expressions, or religious or racial discrimination will not nor-
mally result in “physical injury” and would normally be measured by 
emotional pain and suffering.278  Yet, under the PLRA, even the most 
malicious or unjustified First Amendment or equal protection violations 
will be insulated from a damages remedy (and in most cases from any 
remedy of any kind).279 
The limitations on attorney’s fees are similarly structured to deter 
legitimate constitutional claims.  The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Awards Act entitles parties who prevail in civil rights actions to a rea-
sonable attorney’s fee.280  The Act thus ensures that the injured party 
would be made whole, since the compensation for the transgression of 
constitutional rights would not be diminished by the cost of proving the 
wrong.  The PLRA modifies the fee shifting provisions of § 1988 in three 
ways:  by capping the hourly rate at 150% of the rates for compensation 
of attorneys appointed to represent defendants in criminal cases, by cap-
ping the amount of the award of attorney’s fees at 150% of any money 
judgment, and by requiring that up to 25% of any money judgment ob-
tained by a prisoner must be applied to offset the amount of attorney’s 
fees awarded against the defendant.281  The hourly rate and the propor-
 
 276. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2003).  The Act has reduced prisoner litigation, see EISENBERG, supra 
note 3, at 539–47 (prisoner civil filings decreased from 40,000 in 1995 to 20,000 in 2001), but there is a 
debate over whether legitimate claims as well as frivolous suits have been eliminated.  See Margo 
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1633–64 (2003). 
 277. 503 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1992). 
 278. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
 279. See, e.g., Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2004); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (free exercise of religion claim).  Indeed, one court applied this provision to a claim for 
unlawful arrest that was unrelated to the plaintiff’s incarcerated status.  Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 
528, 532–34 (11th Cir. 2002), rehearing denied, 331 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2003).  But see Canell v. Light-
ner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (physical injury requirement does not apply to First Amend-
ment claims). 
 280. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).  By authorizing “fee shifting” in civil rights actions, Congress meant 
to stimulate the enforcement of the civil rights laws by giving the private bar a financial incentive to 
provide representation to those with meritorious claims and who would otherwise lack the means to 
vindicate their rights.  Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 
561 (1986); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). 
 281. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2003). 
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tionality caps drop the potential fees below the level of what is reason-
able for private counsel.282 
The only prisoners who are affected by the fee restrictions are those 
whose claims prove to be meritorious.  By reducing the amount of attor-
ney’s fees that a prevailing prisoner can recover, Congress did nothing to 
deter frivolous lawsuits,283 but the legislation has surely discouraged pri-
vate lawyers from taking meritorious prisoner civil rights cases by elimi-
nating the potential for a reasonable fee.  Because of the inherent diffi-
culties of prevailing before a jury on even well-founded prisoner claims, 
facially meritorious cases afford no assurance of a favorable verdict and 
even less assurance of a damage award commensurate with the gravity of 
the wrong or severity of the injury.  By adding to the low probability of 
any fee award the prospect of a fee which is less than reasonable, the 
PLRA substantially reduces the already modest inducement to lawyers 
to represent prisoners with meritorious claims.284 
The PLRA attorney’s fees provision has been sustained by the 
courts of appeals as rationally related to the purpose of discouraging 
frivolous prisoner litigation and preserving limited state resources.285  By 
contrast, as we have seen, Congressional efforts to expand remedies for 
civil rights violations are far more strictly scrutinized.286 
V. REMEDIES IN THE CONTEXT OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
The network of remedies for constitutional violations committed by 
police, prosecutors, and judges in criminal prosecutions is an integral part 
of the remedial framework for constitutional infringements and must be 
considered in evaluating the overall effectiveness and fairness of the lar-
ger remedial framework.  Criminal procedural remedies are grounded on 
personal right and deterrence rationales similar to the justifications for 
civil remedies, but the forms of the remedies—exclusion of evidence, dis-
missal of criminal charges, and the reversal of convictions—are quite dis-
tinct in form and application from their civil counterparts.  The Court’s 
constitutional criminal procedure remedial jurisprudence reflects many 
 
 282. At current CJA rates, the maximum hourly fee for prisoner litigation is $135/hour, an 
amount lower by several degrees than the standard hourly rates charged by even modestly experi-
enced lawyers in the legal markets.  See, e.g., Smith v. Phil. Hous. Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 224–26 (3d Cir. 
1997); Black Grievance Comm. v. Phil. Elec. Co., 802 F.2d 648, 652–53 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 283. Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Congress enacted the PLRA pri-
marily to curtail [frivolous] claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.”). 
 284. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 157 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]here are few attorneys who are 
willing to provide free legal assistance to prisoners in civil rights cases. . . . The possibility of obtaining 
attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is generally not a sufficient financial inducement, for fees there-
under depend upon success in the litigation, and the prospective amount of recovery in most prisoner 
civil rights cases is usually small.” (citing Howard S. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases, 
17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 462–66, 477 (1992))). 
 285. See, e.g., Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 583 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 286. See supra notes 189–98 and accompanying text. 
RUDOVSKY.DOC 10/13/2005  2:30:49 PM 
No. 5] EXPANDED RIGHTS AND RESTRICTED REMEDIES 1245 
of the policy concerns that animate the debate over civil rights remedies, 
including cost-benefit analysis of sanctions against law enforcement offi-
cers, federalism, separation of powers, and due process versus crime con-
trol considerations. 
In assessing the role and scope of criminal procedural remedies, 
some threshold observations are appropriate.  First, the remedies that 
are available are limited to a specific class of persons—those accused of 
crime.  Further, within that class, certain violations of rights will not be 
subject to any criminal procedural remedy or sanction.  For example, 
Fourth Amendment violations that do not result in the seizure of evi-
dence, instances of excessive or unreasonable force, and coercive inter-
rogation techniques that run counter to Fifth Amendment protections 
(but do not result in statements that are introduced at trial), cannot be 
remedied in the criminal process.  These claims are relegated to the civil 
law for remedies.  At the same time, for many defendants within the 
criminal justice system, the criminal procedural remedies will be exclu-
sive.  Thus, for example, by reason of the doctrine of absolute judicial 
immunity, any remedy for judicial or prosecutorial misconduct will re-
side, if at all, in the criminal process. 
Second, remedies for the criminal defendant are burdened by doc-
trines of standing,287 prejudice,288 harmless error,289 and exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule290—all of which mitigate the “consequences to the gov-
ernment in criminal prosecutions of the unconstitutional behavior of law 
enforcement agents.”291  Moreover, as in the civil rights remedial frame-
work, application of these doctrines has the distinct potential of leading 
prosecutors and police to tailor their actions to the sub-constitutional 
level in the real world of law enforcement and criminal trials. 
A. Suppression of Evidence 
The exclusionary rule applies to evidence seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, including certain “fruits” of these violations,292 to 
confessions obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against 
 
 287. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (requiring defendant to have reasonable 
expectation of privacy to have standing to object to illegal search or seizure). 
 288. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1985) (limiting Brady doctrine re-
quiring disclosure of exculpatory evidence to “material” evidence, that which would create a “reason-
able probability” of a different result at trial). 
 289. See Kamin, supra note 10, at 85. 
 290. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (announcing the good faith excep-
tion for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant). 
 291. Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, 
Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2504 (1996). 
 292. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 
(1963).  Of course, this exclusionary rule has been applicable to federal prosecution ever since Weeks 
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
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self-incrimination or Sixth Amendment right to counsel,293 and to identi-
fication evidence obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel or the due process right to be free from unnecessarily suggestive 
and unreliable identification procedures.294  The broad pronouncements 
of the Supreme Court in the cases initially establishing these rights have 
been narrowed,295 but for the most part, the Court has not abandoned the 
foundational principles of these decisions.  Instead, the Court has re-
duced the application of these rights by restricting the exclusionary rule. 
1. The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule 
The Mapp Court, in ruling that the exclusionary rule was applicable 
to state prosecutions and was of a constitutional dimension, determined 
that the rule protected a personal Fourth Amendment right of the de-
fendant to suppress illegally obtained evidence.296  The right to privacy is 
“constitutional in origin . . . [and] is enforceable in the same man-
ner . . . as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause.”297  Soon, 
however, the Court rejected the notion that exclusion was a matter of 
constitutional right and determined that its purpose (and therefore its 
limits) would be defined primarily by the need for deterrence, an issue 
that has become a matter of cost-benefit analysis for the Court.298  Thus, 
in several areas, including grand jury proceedings,299 habeas corpus ac-
tions,300 “good faith” applications for search warrants,301 and deportation 
hearings,302 the Court has refused to order suppression of evidence for 
constitutional violations on the theory that deterrence would not be 
served. 
 
 293. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477, 485 (1981). 
 294. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235–37 
(1967). 
 295. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 623–24 (1991) (Fourth Amendment not appli-
cable to police attempt to seize individual with no probable cause, where seizure is not effectuated); 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in “open 
fields,” even those marked with no trespassing signs); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers one dials on their phone); United States v. Ash, 413 
U.S. 300, 317 (1973) (restricting right to post-indictment identification procedures to physical line-ups, 
as opposed to photo-spreads); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (restricting the right to coun-
sel to post-indictment line-ups). 
 296. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655–56. 
 297. Id. at 660.  The Court pointed as well to considerations of deterrence and the protection of 
judicial integrity.  Id. at 656. 
 298. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 168, at 7; Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater 
Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 79 (1992); 
Christopher Slobogin, Testifying: Police Perjury And What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 
(1996); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future 
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1390 (1983). 
 299. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974). 
 300. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486–88 (1976). 
 301. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906–08 (1984). 
 302. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1042–43 (1984). 
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In United States v. Leon, the Court adopted a good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule in search warrant cases.303  Even where a search 
warrant fails to state probable cause, the Fourth Amendment does not 
require that the evidence be suppressed if the officer who secured the 
warrant believed in reasonable good faith that the facts asserted were 
sufficient to establish probable cause.304  Leon’s good faith exception is 
functionally equivalent to the qualified immunity clearly established law 
standard, and brings with it the same risk that officers will conform their 
conduct to the remedial standard as opposed to the substantive require-
ments of probable cause.  The Court has also created specific exceptions 
to the exclusion of evidence, including the doctrines of “inevitable dis-
covery”305 and “independent source”306 and the use of improperly seized 
evidence to impeach a testifying defendant.307 
Whether these exceptions are justified on the ground that suppres-
sion of relevant evidence cannot advance deterrence interests where po-
lice have acted in good faith, if the goal is to avoid suppressing relevant 
evidence at criminal trials, and at the same time to protect the values of 
the Fourth Amendment, one would expect that other remedies for con-
stitutional violations would be strengthened to compensate for limita-
tions on the exclusionary rule.  To the contrary, as we have seen, the 
Court has significantly restricted civil remedies for constitutional viola-
tions.308  Indeed, while the Court has stressed the deterrence rationale of 
the exclusionary rule, it has refused suppression of evidence where the 
rule would be most effective—when an official acts with the intent of vio-
lating the Fourth Amendment.309 
2. The Fifth Amendment 
The status of Miranda as a constitutionally based prophylactic rule 
makes it difficult to draw a precise line between substantive changes in 
doctrine and remedial limitations.  Where Miranda has been held not to 
apply for lack of “custodial interrogation”310 or ambiguous requests for 
 
 303. 468 U.S. at 922 (1984). 
 304. Id. at 919–20. 
 305. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 306. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). 
 307. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). 
 308. Further, if we were able to perfectly calibrate nonsuppression deterrents to improper arrests, 
searches, and seizures, privacy would still trump “truth,” which is exactly the consequence envisioned 
by the Fourth Amendment.  See Yale Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an “Illogical” or “Unnatural” 
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); Stewart, supra note 298, at 1389–
96. 
 309. See Nix v. Wiliams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (inevitable discovery doctrine permits admission 
of evidence even where officer deliberately violated defendant’s rights); United States v. Payner, 447 
U.S. 727, 731–32 (1980) (deliberate violation of rights of third party with intent to obtain evidence 
against defendant is not subject to suppression remedy even under federal court’s supervisory powers). 
 310. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980) (holding that suggestive conversa-
tion between officers in the presence of the detainee did not constitute questioning). 
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counsel,311 or where “public safety” or other special law enforcement fac-
tors are present,312 the decisions appear to be limitations on the substan-
tive scope of the protections.  Other restrictions are more clearly reme-
dial in nature—for example, the refusal to apply the exclusionary rule to 
any evidence except the statements obtained in violation of Miranda,313 
and the broad exception to the exclusionary rule for Miranda violations 
where the evidence is used to impeach testifying defendants.314 
However classified, these doctrinal limitations not only diminish the 
scope of Miranda protections, but provide interrogators with incentives 
to conduct questioning “outside Miranda.”315  Police detectives in some 
jurisdictions deliberately do not provide warnings to suspects or, where 
suspects invoke their rights, continue to interrogate them without coun-
sel.316  The first method provides a means of obtaining a statement (con-
cededly inadmissible in court), after which the suspect is given the warn-
ings, with the expectation that he will provide the same statement.  This 
tactic was at issue last term in Missouri v. Siebert, and the Court ordered 
that all statements be excluded.317  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion 
emphasized the deliberate actions of the officer to avoid the very point of 
Miranda warnings.318  However, the Court did not expressly rule out all 
such deceptive practices and we can expect that creative police officials 
and prosecutors will continue to attempt to find ways to avoid the 
Miranda ruling.319 
In a related development, the Court has ruled that the Fifth 
Amendment provides no basis for a civil remedy for even a physically 
coerced confession unless the confession was actually used in a criminal 
 
 311. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 455–59 (1994) (ruling that defendant who stated, 
“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” did not speak with sufficient clarity to require that interrogation be 
halted). 
 312. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984). 
 313. United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2622 (2004); see also United States v. Ceccolini, 435 
U.S. 268, 279–80 (1978) (placing restrictions on exclusionary rule with respect to witnesses secured as a 
result of Fourth Amendment violations). 
 314. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722–23 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 
(1971). 
 315. KAMISAR ET AL., Questioning “Outside Miranda,” MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 802 
(10th ed.). 
 316. See Albert Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 1436, 1442–43 (1987) (advice that could be provided to police by Holmesian “badman”). 
 317. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2613 (2004). 
 318. Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 319. See, e.g., KAMISAR, ET AL., 2004 SUPPLEMENT TO MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 127 (10th 
ed.): 
Suppose, a week after Seibert was decided, a deputy district attorney told a group of officers at-
tending a police training session the following:  “don’t write off the interrogation tactics used in 
Seibert.  You can continue to use the same deliberate two-step questioning technique used in that 
case and still get the postwarning statements admitted into evidence. . . . (1) [C]all for a three or 
four-hour break between the first and second questioning session instead of the 20-minute break 
that took place in Seibert or (2) have a different police officer resume the questioning after the 
break instead of using the same officer who did the questioning in the prewarning session or (3) 
after resuming questioning, be careful not to confront the suspect with the same incriminating 
statement(s) she made at the first questioning session. 
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prosecution.320  This ruling protects an official from civil sanctions for in-
tentional misconduct unless the suspect can establish a substantive due 
process violation by showing conduct that “shocks the conscience,” a 
standard that is the most demanding of all of the tests prescribed by the 
Court for constitutional culpability.321 
Finally, there is good reason to be highly skeptical of the process by 
which the courts in criminal cases determine whether constitutional 
criminal procedural violations have occurred.  There are a number of fac-
tors that can distort the adjudication of constitutional criminal proce-
dural claims, including police perjury,322 the police code of silence,323 and 
the reality that the suppression of evidence may terminate or seriously 
undermine a prosecution of a guilty person for a serious crime.  These 
factors can lead even the most conscientious and even-handed judges to 
make fact-findings that justify denial of a remedy where the issues of 
credibility seem to clearly favor the plaintiff.324 
B. Limitations on Federal Habeas Corpus 
Court decisions and Congressional reformulation of the federal ha-
beas corpus statute have resulted in the imposition of a number of pro-
cedural and substantive limitations on federal habeas corpus remedies.  
The procedural minefield that a petitioner must navigate, with its com-
plex barriers of time limitations, exhaustion of state remedies, procedural 
defaults, and harmless error analysis is daunting, and in many cases pre-
cludes a court from reaching the merits of the claim.325  But for present 
purposes, I limit my comments to the remedial consequences of retroac-
tivity doctrine and the limits on the scope of review of state court consti-
tutional adjudications. 
For many years, the Supreme Court struggled with the issue of ret-
roactive application of new constitutional doctrine in the criminal proce-
dure arena.  In the period immediately following the Court’s decisions in 
Mapp, Miranda, and Gideon, retroactive application was subject to a 
multipart test, which required an examination of the purposes of the rule, 
the degree to which law enforcement had relied on previous doctrine, 
and the overall effect on the administration of justice.326  Having opened 
the door to nonretroactive application, the Court would soon be faced 
 
 320. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003) (rejecting Fifth Amendment basis for damages 
claim where confession not used at trial). 
 321. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–50 (1998). 
 322. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 298. 
 323. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of New Orleans, 687 F.2d 80, 82–83 (5th Cir.1982); SKOLNICK & 
FYFE, supra note 204, at 108–12; Chin & Wells, supra note 208, at 250–56. 
 324. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 298. 
 325. See, e.g., RANDY HERTZ & JAMES LIEBERMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS, PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 107–321 (3d ed. 1998). 
 326. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636–38 
(1965). 
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with a persistent challenge to its methodology by Justice Harlan who 
proposed an approach that would require retroactive application to all 
cases on direct appeal of a “new” constitutional rule, but would largely 
deny such application to cases at the stage of collateral attack.327 
The Supreme Court took the first step to implement this view of 
retroactivity in 1987 when it decided that new rules would always be ap-
plicable to cases not yet final on direct appeal, stating that any other ap-
proach would violate “basic norms of constitutional adjudication.”328  
Then, in Teague v. Lane, where a federal habeas petitioner sought to ar-
gue that the Sixth Amendment prohibited a prosecutor from exercising 
peremptory challenges to deny the defendant a fair cross-section of the 
community, the Court denied review on the ground that a decision in fa-
vor of the petitioner on the merits would apply a new constitutional rule 
in a collateral proceeding.329  The Court did recognize two exceptions to 
this nonretroactivity principle, but they are exceedingly narrow in 
scope.330  A plurality of the Court went even further in stating that it 
would bar any federal habeas petition that itself would result in a new 
constitutional rule, on the theory that because the petitioner could not 
benefit by the decision, any ruling would amount to an advisory opin-
ion.331 
The Court has interpreted the new rule element of Teague to bar 
any claim that was not “dictated by [Supreme Court] precedent existing 
at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.”332  Under this for-
mulation, even where the new rule was a likely result from precedent or 
even the most reasonable interpretation of prior law, there is no retroac-
tivity unless no other interpretation was reasonable.333  In applying this 
standard, the Court has made specific reference to the qualified immu-
 
 327. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 688–89 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Desist v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258–69 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 328. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987). 
 329. 489 U.S. 288, 299–316 (1989).  The plurality opinion was ultimately adopted by the Court.  
See O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156–68 (1997); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 487–95 (1990). 
 330. First, a rule would be retroactive if it placed “certain kinds of primary, private individual 
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”  Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 607, 692 (1971)).  Second, certain “watershed rules,” but 
only those which implicate the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding could be applied retro-
actively.  Id. at 311.  The Court has rarely invoked either prong.  See, e.g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 
227, 233–45 (1996) (rejecting retroactivity of rule of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)). 
 331. See Teague 489 U.S. at 316. The Court fully adopted this position in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 
at 487–95. 
 332. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). 
 333. See Beard v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 2504, 2512–15 (2004) (finding that the rule of Mills v. Mary-
land, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), was not compelled by existing precedent); O’Dell, 521 U.S. at 164–66 (stat-
ing that even where Court stated that result was “compelled” by precedent, it is still a new rule if a 
“reasonable jurist . . . would not have felt compelled to adopt the rule”); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 
U.S. 518, 527–39 (1997); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1990) (holding that a law is “new” 
under Teague even though the Court had declared that it was “controlled” by precedent as this is not 
conclusive for the “new rule” determination).  The Court has found a rule to be retroactive only once 
since Teague.  See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313–19, 329–30 (1989) (holding that requiring juries 
in the capital sentencing context to consider mitigating evidence did not create a “new rule”). 
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nity doctrine, noting that just as a court considering immunity should not 
consider the legal issue at a high level of generality in determining 
whether law was clearly established, a habeas court must also refrain 
from finding that an outcome was dictated by prior precedent announc-
ing general principles of law.334 
The habeas law became even more restrictive with the adoption in 
1996 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 
which limits the scope or review of state criminal convictions by permit-
ting relief only where the state court ruling was “contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as de-
termined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”335  Under this pro-
vision, a state court ruling that erroneously determines that there has not 
been a constitutional violation cannot be the basis for habeas relief if the 
state court ruling was reasonable.336  Relief is precluded unless the state 
court decision rejects a Supreme Court precedent or principle in a case 
involving “materially indistinguishable facts” or the decision “unrea-
sonably applies that principle to the facts of the . . . case.”337  This provi-
sion bars federal relief for unconstitutional state court convictions be-
yond those already barred by Teague.338 
The combination of Teague preclusion of claims and AEDPA def-
erential review of state court judgments recasts habeas law.  Vindication 
of federal rights is no longer the premise; rather, the role of habeas is to 
deter state courts from committing constitutional error.  Because most 
cases involve questions of law that are at least debatable on some theo-
retical point, this approach, which reflects the “good faith” tests of im-
munity and the exclusionary rule, and which disables federal judges from 
reviewing such decisions, may well signal to state court judges and law 
enforcement officials that they need not be concerned about fairly apply-
ing constitutional standards in their actions and judgments.  A standard 
of review that permitted relief where the rule was “clearly foreshad-
owed”339 or where a reasonable jurist would have good reason to believe 
that the rule would be announced, would protect against unforeseeable 
 
 334. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. at 236 (1990) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 
(1987)). 
 335. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000). 
 336. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
 337. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) 
(holding that the state court determination that the three-strike provision was not in violation of 
Eighth Amendment was reasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24–27 (2002) (holding that 
the state court determination regarding whether lawyer’s actions prejudiced defendant was not unrea-
sonable). 
 338. There is debate as to whether the habeas court should even address the merits of the claim.  
See, e.g., Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 157 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (finding that the court need not de-
termine whether there was a violation when the merits of the claim were adjudicated in state court).  
Of course, as in the Teague cases, if the court does not decide the issue, it remains unresolved and a 
later state court decision on similarly incorrect, but not unreasonable constitutional theory, will again 
be insulated from review on federal habeas. 
 339. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1816–17. 
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new decisions, but still encourage state courts to consider the develop-
ment of constitutional law. 
We have seen similar deference to law enforcement in the formula-
tion of qualified immunity doctrine, where the Court has denied damages 
to plaintiffs when the defendant official violated constitutional principles 
that were not clearly established and in the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.340  While 
the qualified immunity defense and the good faith exception are not as 
broad as Teague’s nonretroactivity and AEDPA’s deferential standard of 
review,341 these doctrines operate in a mutually reinforcing manner and 
over a broad spectrum of cases to preclude relief for constitutional viola-
tions. 
C. The Harmless Error Doctrine 
The harmless error doctrine has evolved into a complex set of stan-
dards for review of criminal convictions that differ depending upon both 
the form of review (direct or collateral) and whether the error is of con-
stitutional dimension.342  In brief, constitutional errors that are subject to 
a harmless error standard are grounds for reversal on direct review 
unless the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the error was harmless.343  By contrast, on collateral review in federal ha-
beas corpus, the standard is more deferential and the constitutional error 
is deemed harmless unless it “had substantial and injurious effect or in-
fluence in determining the jury’s verdict.”344  By its very nature, the doc-
trine will preclude remedies in a significant number of cases of constitu-
tional violations.345  Even if it is legitimate to deny the remedy of a new 
trial where the violation can with confidence be said to have had no 
meaningful impact on the verdict, it must be recognized that the defen-
dant is left without any cognizable remedies.  Absolute immunity will 
 
 340. See supra notes 22, 303–07 and accompanying text. 
 341. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742 (2002) (no immunity even in the absence of direct 
precedent where no reasonable official could believe that the conduct was permissible); cf. Sawyer v. 
Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 236 (1990) (comparing qualified immunity and habeas review standards). 
 342. See, e.g., Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422 (1980); Kamin, supra note 10, at 8 n.18 (listing articles); Stacy & Dayton, Re-
thinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM L. REV. 79, 82–83 (1988). 
 343. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  Almost all trial errors are subject to harmless 
error review.  See Arizona v. Fuliminante, 499 U.S. 279, 282 (1991) (coerced confessions can be harm-
less error).  Certain “structural” errors, such as denial of self-representation, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 
U.S. 168, 177–78 n.8 (1984), and right to a public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984), 
are not subject to harmless error analysis. 
 344. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). 
 345. As Fallon & Meltzer have observed, supra note 10, at 1773 n.224, “[t]he harmless error doc-
trine is by no means a minor remedial detail.  In Judge Posner’s arresting phrase, ‘[t]he expansive code 
of constitutional criminal procedure that the Supreme Court has created in the name of the Constitu-
tion is like the grapes of Tantalus, since the equally expansive harmless error rule in most cases pre-
vents a criminal defendant from obtaining any benefit from the code.’ United States v. Pallais, 921 
F.2d 684, 692 (7th Cir. 1990).” 
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protect judges and prosecutors; qualified immunity will protect police of-
ficers involved in the prosecution; exhaustion principles will preclude any 
civil suit that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [the] convic-
tion;”346 and equitable relief will be barred by standing and related prin-
ciples. 
Moreover, in defining constitutional doctrine, the Court has often 
included as an element of a violation, a prejudice component that oper-
ates as a kind of internal harmless error doctrine.347  Thus, a Sixth 
Amendment claim of ineffective counsel requires the defendant to show 
both that the lawyer’s conduct fell below professional standards and that 
the defendant was prejudiced, that there is a “reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”348  Similarly, where the defendant claims a 
violation of her due process right to disclosure of exculpatory evidence, 
she must show that the nondisclosure was “material,” that is, there would 
be a reasonable probability of a different result had it been disclosed.349  
And, under the Court’s test for determining whether police identification 
procedures were unnecessarily suggestive and therefore in violation of 
due process, a court must consider whether the resulting identification 
was sufficiently “reliable” to permit its use at trial.350  These “prejudice” 
standards are often determinative of whether a violation is established, 
and whether the decision to deny relief is made as a matter of substantive 
law or by means of remedial limitations—the same unconstitutional con-
duct has been insulated from a remedy.  Moreover, by denying relief for 
lack of prejudice, the substantive rule loses some of its deterrent force 
since a prosecutor can decide to withhold exculpatory evidence on the 
gamble that a court will later find the evidence not to be “material,” and 
an officer can use suggestive identification procedures knowing that a 
court will likely find any resulting identification to be reliable. 
There is yet another dimension to the harmless error doctrine.  The 
operation of this rule has the “capacity to make the separation of rights 
from remedies permanent” since a determination of harmless error, even 
though it is usually accompanied by a determination that there was a 
constitutional violation, does nothing to prevent the same type of viola-
tion in future cases.351  Indeed, even where a prosecutor deliberately vio-
 
 346. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 
 347. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 
2005 WIS. L. REV. 35. 
 348. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
 349. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 699–700 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
112–13 (1976). 
 350. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977). 
 351. Kamin, supra note 10, at 6.  In cases involving “internal” harmless error rules, for example, 
ineffectiveness of counsel or denial of exculpatory evidence, the Court has suggested that a reviewing 
court is free to jump immediately to the issue of prejudice and not decide the issue of the conduct of 
the lawyer or prosecutor.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S 897, 924–
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lates the law, harmless error will continue to prevent reversals if the er-
ror was not sufficiently prejudicial: 
Thus, while both qualified immunity and nonretroactivity disen-
franchise early claimants in favor of later ones, harmless error func-
tions very differently.  Like the other two doctrines, it lowers the 
cost of innovation, at least if merits may be decided before the 
question of entitlement to a remedy.  Unlike these other doctrines, 
however, harmless error does not have the capacity to change be-
haviors over time, because it does not contain a temporal element.  
An error that is harmless in case one will likely be harmless in later 
cases; while both qualified immunity and nonretroactivity ratchet 
up the pressure on state officers, harmless error does not.352 
Harmless error is an expansive constitutional “safe harbor.”353  As 
Professor Carol Steiker has demonstrated, the doctrine is part of the 
counter-revolution in criminal procedure that leaves the substantive 
framework of earlier cases, but without viable remedies—here, by an 
“inclusionary rule” on appeal.354 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Remedial measures for the protection and vindication of constitu-
tional rights will be effective to the degree that they compensate for indi-
vidual violations, deter misconduct, and create a system that conforms 
the conduct of governmental officials to constitutional norms.  The base-
line of remedies should include the traditional civil remedies of damages 
and equitable relief, and the constitutional criminal procedural remedies 
that have evolved to protect the rights of suspects and defendants in the 
criminal process.  However, a remedial paradigm built on alternative 
remedies can achieve these goals, without affording each theoretically 
available remedy in all cases. 
The current remedial framework promises compensation, deter-
rence, and accountability, but in practice there are large and troubling 
gaps in each of these areas.  Remedies have been restricted on the theory 
that other remedies would be available, but in too many cases the Court 
has failed to adjust the remedial scheme to ensure the viability of this 
substitution process.  The Court appears to be satisfied with a process 
 
25 (1984) (holding that the issue of good faith can be decided in some cases without determining 
whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation). 
 352. Kamin, supra note 10, at 61 (footnotes omitted). 
 353. Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Inci-
dental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1032 (2001). 
 354. Steiker, supra note 291, at 2504.  Limitations on criminal procedural remedies do not only 
affect remedial rights in the criminal case setting.  As I have explained, as a result of exhaustion, es-
toppel and related theories, the failure of the criminal defendant to secure relief in the criminal case 
will often preclude any civil rights action for the constitutional violation.  Thus, the broader the limits 
on relief in the criminal context, the broader the preclusive effect will be on possible alternative reme-
dies.  Increasingly, the web that insulates police, prosecutors, judges and other public officials from 
remedial sanctions is one that permits no escape. 
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that addresses the most egregious of constitutional violations, but which 
denies compensatory damages in a significant portion of cases.  Defer-
ring to reasonable unconstitutional conduct not only denies relief to indi-
vidual victims of unconstitutional conduct, but also creates a system in 
which law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges risk little in act-
ing in accordance with the sub-constitutional standards that are a by-
product of remedial restrictions.  While substantive constitutional law is 
not frozen under this process, and courts continue to articulate the gov-
erning substantive standards, the mutually reenforcing limitations on and 
exceptions to traditional remedies have in some respects turned the Con-
stitution into an honor code of conduct. 
The paradox of expanding rights and limited remedies has not 
closed the door to civil rights claims.  Thousands of civil claims are filed 
each year, others are settled without litigation, and in the criminal proc-
ess, courts continue to exclude evidence and reverse convictions for un-
constitutional conduct.  But the numbers mask a trend to eliminate or 
severely restrict remedies in a significant number of cases.  The fact that 
in the modern era federal courts have broadened substantive rights 
makes even more poignant the reciprocal limitations on remedies.  Con-
tinued articulation of the governing constitutional standards will not be 
sufficient to hold government officials in check where the restrictions on 
remedies are pervasive.  Remedial gaps may be inevitable, but the sys-
temic manner in which the Court and Congress have restricted remedies 
for constitutional violations leaves increasingly intolerable voids in the 
essential protective shield of the Constitution. 
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